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Abstract
There have been significant developments in the field of transport ticketing.
Major transport operators are transitioning from closed-loop, proprietary sys-
tems to open systems that utilise the global payment infrastructure for tick-
eting via smart cards and, increasingly, smartphones.
Modern smartphones support Near Field Communication (NFC) which
can be used to emulate contactless smart card tickets. NFC transactions are
quick, making them a viable technology for use in transport ticketing where
speed is very critical. NFC transactions initially required a Secure Element
(SE) for security reasons. However, commercial constraints and restrictive
security practices relating to the SE have paved the way for Host Card Emu-
lation (HCE). HCE facilitates NFC transactions without requiring an SE; this
provides a simpler and more flexible ecosystem, at the expense of security.
This thesis investigates the impact of the aforementioned developments on
the security and performance of mobile devices in ticketing. A comparative
analysis of various security mechanisms that have been put forward as options
to mitigate the security risks of HCE is carried out, and their suitability for
ticketing is determined. A novel ticketing protocol based on Linkable Digital
Signatures is proposed to solve the problem of blacklisting (the barring of in-
valid tickets/smartphones) in tokenised payments. A novel tokenisation frame-
work based on Format Preserving Encryption (FPE) algorithms and Trusted
Execution Environments (TEE) for secure token generation on the user’s de-
vice has been proposed. All proposals were implemented on mobile devices to
test the performance for efficiency.
The work conducted in this thesis shows that mobile devices, and partic-
ularly HCE, offer several benefits in ticketing, however, a new approach to
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security is required. It also shows that despite the clear advantages of adopt-
ing open payments, careful considerations must be taken for it to be successful
in ticketing.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Historically, public transport has gone through significant transformation with
respect to ticketing and fare collection, from the very early days of cash and
paper tickets, to transport ticketing systems with a degree of automation that
accept smart tickets. A ticket is considered to be smart if it has some access-
controlled memory where the entitlement to travel can be stored, read and/or
modified electronically by an external terminal (smart ticketing). Tradition-
ally smart tickets took the form of a microchip embedded in a contactless
smartcard, issued by the transport operator for use in proprietary systems.
The state of the art today is the use of contactless bank cards and Near Field
Communication (NFC)-enabled mobile devices. NFC is a short-range com-
munication technology that is capable of emulating a smartcard on a mobile
device, and facilitates communication between a device and an external con-
tactless smartcard reader, which in this context is a terminal1 at a train station
or on a bus. What makes NFC even more suitable is its compatibility with
existing ticketing infrastructure that already accepts contactless smartcards
because they both conform to the ISO/IEC 14443 standards [5]. Crucially,
1For this point, the term terminal is used to collectively refer to a contactless reader, the
software that manages the contactless transaction, and the turnstile that enforces physical
access control according to the decision taken
16
transport ticketing applications are speed-critical, which makes NFC an at-
tractive and suitable technology, because NFC transactions are very fast.
The integration of NFC into mobile devices has led to a paradigm shift in
the way traditional payments and ticketing transactions are carried out. In
comparison to smart-cards, NFC-enabled mobile devices present new possi-
bilities, as well as constraints, for the transport ticketing ecosystem. Mobile
devices provide a richer User Interface and User Experience (UI & UX re-
spectively), in addition to higher processing power. They also help users by
consolidating their payment instruments into a single device, rather than hav-
ing multiple cards for similar purposes. Additionally, the transport operators
make cost savings in terms of issuing and managing cards and card systems.
However, the conventional security architecture of the mobile device presents
its own constraints, which are more business than technical ones. These con-
straints, along with the promise shown by NFC technology, have led to radical
changes in terms of the NFC security architecture, which presents new research
frontiers that are yet to be explored.
From a research perspective, much work has been done in the area of
transport ticketing security, with a major focus on user privacy. While pri-
vacy is undoubtedly an important aspect of ticketing, fundamental changes
to the ticketing architecture in practice and the evolution of mobile technolo-
gies present research gaps, which the work in this thesis sets out to bridge.
The beginning of the research presented here coincides with the onset of two
new developments in relation to transport ticketing which have subsequently
shaped its direction.
In recent developments, transport operators are moving away from closed-
loop ticketing systems that only accept tickets issued by the transport oper-
ator, and thus can only be used for ticketing and related services, to open
17
ticketing systems. Open ticketing systems use the traditional payment infras-
tructure; they accept regular contactless bank cards and other mobile tech-
nology to access the transport service. This effectively shifts the business of
payments away from the transport operator, and payments are handled by the
payment industry in the same way as other payments in retail trading.
There has also been a radical change in the way transactions using NFC
devices are carried out. NFC transactions using card emulation were expected
to make use of a hardware Secure Element (SE) in the mobile device to house
sensitive applications and related data. In a transaction using an SE card
emulation, messages are routed to the SE directly, without being visible to the
Operating System (OS). This concept achieves its purpose in terms of security
because of the hardware-backed isolation and tamper-resistance provided by
the SE. However, restrictive practices (motivated by commercial as well a
security interests) prevented developers form having access to the SE; which
frustrated service development. These factors led to a slow adoption of NFC
in many sectors, including transport. To address this problem, a new way
of performing card emulation that bypasses the SE emerged; this is referred
to as Host Card Emulation (HCE). HCE lets an application on the host OS
communicate directly with an external NFC terminal. This allows for a simpler
and more flexible ecosystem at the expense of security. HCE offers less attack-
resistance than SE card emulation since it relies on the software mechanisms
of the device for security.
One of the known security mechanisms in mobile payment systems is to
store temporary payment credentials in the smartphone, a technique known
as tokenisation. However, this can be a problem for transport ticketing se-
curity processes, which rely on fixed and permanent payment credentials for
blacklisting.
The work presented in this thesis considers different aspects of transport
ticketing, and investigates the impact of the aforementioned developments on
18
ticketing security and performance.
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1.2 Research Questions
1. How does the shift from SE-based to HCE-based NFC transactions im-
pact the security and performance of transport ticketing systems?
2. What is the impact of tokenisation —a payment security mechanism—
on open ticketing systems?
3. Can a new privacy-preserving protocol be proposed that will allow user
blacklisting without requiring a unique identifier?
4. To what extent can advances in Trusted Execution Environments (TEE)
for mobile devices be used to enhance the security of transport ticketing
processes?
20
1.3 Contributions
The main contributions of the thesis are as follows:
1. The state of the art in ticketing and an analysis of current trends relating
to ticketing are presented.
2. An assessment of the security and performance of NFC devices in trans-
port ticketing is conducted: A variable performance behaviour of HCE
applications is revealed, and its impact on security is considered.
3. Analysis of tokenisation, and how it calls into question blacklisting,
which is an important fraud and security control process in transport
ticketing systems.
4. A proposal for a novel, privacy-preserving transport ticketing scheme
using linkable group digital signatures is given, solving the problem of
blacklisting in tokenised transactions.
5. A proposal is given for a novel tokenisation framework that relies on a
TEE and Format Preserving Encryption (FPE) algorithms, to generate
on-device tokens.
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1.4 Organisation of the Thesis
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows:
Chapter 2 sets the scene and tone of the thesis. The evolution of ticketing
fare media is presented. A discussion of notable ticketing schemes around the
world is then provided. Different ticketing concepts are described, providing
an essential background to the work carried out in the thesis.
Chapter 3 opens with a discussion of NFC devices and their applicability
to ticketing. We look at the security aspects of NFC on mobile devices and
their impact on ticketing. An analysis of various mechanisms proposed to
mitigate the security risks introduced by Host Card Emulation (HCE) and
the suitability of the mechanisms for ticketing is also presented. This chapter
concludes with a summary of the trends in the payment industry, and what
they mean for transport ticketing.
A comparison of the performance of similar implementations of an SE-
based application, and a HCE-based Android application is carried out in
Chapter 4. We identify a specific behaviour of applications in HCE, which
calls into question the performance of mobile devices in transport ticketing.
Regardless of the superiority of HCEs in terms of processing power as com-
pared to an SE, we show how the behaviour affects security mechanisms and
assumptions used in smartcards, and by extension SEs, which will not hold in
mobile transactions.
Chapter 5 focuses on the problem of blacklisting tokenised payments.
It shows how tokenisation—which is a security mechanism proposed for HCE
applications—contradicts blacklisting, which is an important function of trans-
port ticketing systems. A novel solution to the problem using linkable group
digital signatures is presented. Practical implementation and testing of the
solution shows mobile devices have sufficient processing power to efficiently
handle complex cryptographic operations, allowing for the realisation of a
22
privacy-preserving blacklisting solution.
In Chapter 6, the use of TEEs as a security mechanism for HCE applica-
tions is analysed. I highlight a possible problem with the closed nature of TEEs
in the ecosystem. Different ownership models are considered with respect to
their centricity, and a recommendation is made based on their suitability for
adoption in the transport ticketing domain.
Chapter 7 presents a novel tokenisation framework for the on-device gen-
eration of tokens. To achieve this, a FPE algorithm is implemented as a mobile
application.
Chapter 8 presents the major conclusions of the thesis in relation to the
research questions. The future research directions that could be explored are
also outlined,
23
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Chapter 2
Background I: Ticketing
Systems
2.1 Evolution of Ticketing Fare Media
The very early days of ticketing involved the use of cash in exchange for a
paper ticket or a physical token that acts as the right to travel. However, the
use of cash has many challenges that directly affects the efficiency of ticketing
systems. Cash is very expensive and inefficient to handle for the transport
operators. It also makes the boarding of transport vehicles time-consuming
and generally impractical with the growing number of public transport users.
The aforementioned problems with cash led to the introduction of the first
automated ticketing systems.
Automated ticketing systems have the ability to validate tickets and apply
logic as to whether the user has the right to travel. This decision is enforced
using gates or turnstiles to allow or deny users access to the transport service.
Earlier automated systems accepted cards and paper tickets with a Magnetic
stripe (Magstripe) [6] that encodes the information. This significantly solves
the problems introduced by the circulation of cash in the system and also
makes boarding transport vehicles faster and more efficient. The low cost of
production, and durability of these types of tickets makes them ideal for both
single-journey and multiple-journey tickets. Nevertheless, magstripe tickets
25
have their own downsides: they have a very limited storage capacity of about
24 bytes, which is a constraint to the complexity and number of tickets it can
hold. The level of security that can be achieved in magstripe is very low be-
cause of their inability to carry out any processing. Consequently magstripe
tickets are prone to cloning. These issues with magstripe tickets, advances
in smartcard technology, and reduced cost of silicon established contactless
smartcards based on the ISO/IEC 14443 standard as an ideal option for tick-
eting.
Contactless smartcards have the ability to carry out processing, and have
bigger storage capacities. This means they can support higher levels of secu-
rity than the magstripe tickets. They are also more durable and are therefore
suitable for long validity tickets (season tickets). From the transport operators
perspective, the use of smartcards enhances travel data collection and mining,
which can be used for a smarter resources allocation and a better service de-
livery [7]. As alluded to in Chapter 1, NFC devices are capable of emulating
smartcards and communicating with an external terminal. This offers a nat-
ural progression from smartcards, but with an added advantage of a higher
processing power, and a UI. More on NFC is covered in Chapter 3.
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2.2 Description of Ticketing Systems
The specifics of each ticketing system will vary according to particular use-
cases, assumptions, technological choices and business agreements in place.
Nevertheless a general description of ticketing systems is given in this section.
A generic architecture, the participants, and phases that make up a ticketing
system are described. A classification of ticketing systems based on their
payments model, as well as business logic is also presented.
2.2.1 General Architecture
The generic architecture of ticketing systems consists of various components
at four levels:
Level 0 - Fare Media
The device used to deliver the ticket payload to the validation terminals. These
include contactless smartcards and NFC-enabled mobile devices.
Level 1 - Validation Terminals
The term terminal in ticketing may be used to refer to different components
depending on the implementation. For example, it can mean a mobile device
used by ticket inspectors to scan tickets during a journey. In this context,
validation terminal refers to a ticketing device capable of reading, writing or
modifying a ticket. In gated stations, the terminal also includes a physical
mechanism –typically a turnstile– to enforce access control according to the
decision-taking after interacting with the ticket. The terminals are connected
to the back-office systems for periodic reporting and status updates.
Level 2 - Back Office Systems
Back office systems are managed and maintained by the transport operator.
They are used for the general management and administration of ticketing
systems. Functions of the back office include: fare and ticket management, user
account management, report management and handling of terminals updates.
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In closed-loop ticketing systems (see Section 2.3.1) with a single transport
operator, the back office also carries out financial clearing and settlement
functions.
Level 3 - Central Clearing and Settlement Systems
Most real-life implementations will involve different operators controlling dif-
ferent parts of a geographic location. The central clearing and settlement
offices are used to provide financial functions including: apportionment of rev-
enue among the relevant transport operators, central reporting and updating
services, and general ticket and user administration.
2.2.2 Participants
The participants in a ticketing system include:
1. Users: A user is the entity that makes use of the transport service. The
user either purchases the ticket prior to travel, and verifies its possession
at the point of travel, or the user is reliably associated with the usage of
the service, for post billing and payment.
2. Transport Operator: The transport operator provides the transport ser-
vice. It may consist of different sub-entities providing services such as
ticket issuing and accounting services. It manages the ticketing infras-
tructure such as payment terminals and turnstiles and puts in place
controls to ensure system security and functionality.
3. Payment Service Provider: With the advent of open ticketing systems,
the payment ecosystem has become directly involved in ticketing. The
term Payment Service Provider is used here to collectively refer to the
payments ecosystem including banks and the payment networks (see
Section 2.3.2).
The aforementioned participants represent the minimum participants ac-
cording to most proposals, this is however not exclusive. For example the work
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in [8] includes a Certifying Authority (CA) which provisions credentials to the
user’s device and performs accounting services. Chaumette et al. considered a
ticketing architecture in [9] that requires a Trusted Service Manager (TSM) to
personalise, load and manage tickets in the Subscriber Identity Module (SIM)
of the user’s device.
2.2.3 Phases
Ticketing is made up of different independent but related phases as follows:
1. Set-up Phase: Prior to travel, there is usually a step where the user
registers to the system, pays for the service if the scheme is prepaid
and is issued with the tickets. The set-up phase is also when the user
downloads the ticketing application, or is been issued a smart-card in the
case of smart-card based ticketing schemes. For cryptographic ticketing
solutions, this is the stage where cryptographic handshake, such as key
exchange, and other parameter settings take place. There are also in-
stances where the transport operator may need to personalise the profile
of some users, for example, to offer special discounts to senior citizens.
2. Purchase Phase: In this phase, users select and pay for their tickets. For
prepaid travel, users top up their devices with the desired amount of
money. More on the payment models on ticketing systems is presented
in Section 2.3.
3. Provisioning Phase: This is the phase where the tickets are fulfilled1 to
the users’ device, following a successful payment authorisation of tickets
in the previous phase. The tickets are ready for use at the end of this
phase. Some proposals [10, 11] merge the purchase and provisioning
phases into a single phase.
1Ticket fulfilment refers to the delivery of tickets to the user or user’s device.
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4. Validation Phase: This is the phase where users travel with their pur-
chased tickets or in the case of Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG), their topped-up
devices. The ticketing system validates that the ticket presented to it is
valid and has the right to perform the intended journey.
5. Inspection Phase: This phase is usually carried out at random to verify
that user’s have a valid right to travel, which could be a pre-purchased
ticket or an evidence to show they properly tapped their device prior to
travel. Inspection is carried out by a personnel either with a Revenue
Inspection Device (RID), which interrogates the fare media or visually
to check that a valid ticket is held by the user (either physically or within
a fare media). Researchers have shown visual inspection of tickets held
within mobile devices to be vulnerable [12], unless certain measures –
such as a dynamic watermarking are deployed.
6. Accounting Phase: This phase happens at the back-office after journeys
have been made. For account-based implementations such as the one
proposed in Chapter 5, this is the phase where journey construction2
is carried out to determine the fare to charge the user. For ticketing
systems that include multiple transport operators, the apportionment of
the revenue between them occurs at this stage [13].
7. Blacklisting Phase: This is a fraud and control measure, it only becomes
necessary when there is a need to deter a particular user or user’s device
from travel. Blacklisting may occur due to a number of reasons includ-
ing lost device, overspending, lack of funds, or in the case of system
compromise.
2Journey Construction is the process of aggregating the entry and exit points of a user
on a transport network, to determine the fare to be charged at the back-office.
30
2.3 Classification of Ticketing Systems
Ticketing systems can broadly be classified from two perspectives: the level at
which ‘business logic’ is applied, and according to the ‘payments model’ they
conform to. Business logic here refers to the encoding of real-world business
rules which are used to make a decision on how a user’s ticket should be treated
and on how fares should be determined. The business logic of ticketing systems
can be card-based3 or account-based.
According to their payment model, ticketing systems can also be classified
into closed-loop Systems and open-loop Systems. The payment model repre-
sents the type of infrastructure they rely on to clear and settle funds generated
through the collection of fares. These categories of ticketing systems are fur-
ther explained below:
2.3.1 Card-Based Ticketing Systems (CBT)
This category of ticketing systems apply the business logic prior to usage of
the system, i.e. the system validates that the user has the right to travel at
the front-end. Users are required to either purchase a ticket prior to travel, or
top up funds in the case of Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) travel. The pre-purchased
ticket or top up value is stored on the device, and prior to travel, the terminal
checks that the ticket is valid or that the existing value on the device is enough
to pay for the fare.
CBT systems have drawbacks that is making them less and less favourable
for most transport operators. Any change of business logic, such as fare prices
and discounts, will have to be propagated to all the terminals. This is an
expensive and often a daunting process. In addition, the loss of a user’s fare
media usually leads to the loss of the balance stored on the card. Account-
Based ticketing, presented below, addresses some of these challenges.
3The term card-based has evolved to include mobile-based solutions, but the industry
has retained the term.
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2.3.2 Account-Based Ticketing Systems (ABT)
In the case of ABT systems, the logic is applied at the back-office level, and the
terminal front-end only verifies the user is legitimate, and acknowledges usage
of the system in a secure and reliable way. The evidence of usage captured
is widely referred to as a tap, and typically includes information such as time
and location. These taps are used at the back-office to determine the right
fare to charge the user.
One of the main advantages of ABT is an easier and more efficient way
of changing the business logic. Changes only need to be applied at the back-
office where the accounts are held, rather than updating all the terminals in the
field. This also enables the transport operator to give more tailored services to
the users. Moving the logic to the back-office also opens up the possibility of
using different ‘tokens’ aside from the transport-specific fare media, to reliably
identify users since all that is needed is to reliably establish their use of the
transport network.
2.3.3 Closed-Loop Ticketing
Closed-loop have for a long time been the de facto systems for ticketing. The
term Closed-loop here refers to the fact that the fare media is only valid for
use within a specific ticketing scheme, which is typically the scheme managed
by the transport operator. This means that the fare media itself, tickets and
the value they hold cannot be used to pay for any other services - not even
for travel on a different transport operators scheme. While these systems offer
advantages over the paper-based ticketing, their proprietary nature introduces
some disadvantages;
2.3.3.1 Disadvantages of Closed-Loop Ticketing Systems
1. High Costs of Infrastructure: There is a significant cost incurred by the
transport operator for proprietary infrastructure both in terms of capital
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and operational expenditure upfront, and for ongoing maintenance. The
cost of issuing and managing the fare media is also significant, especially
for smartcard based systems.
2. High Cost of Fare Collection: The cost of fare collection is can also be
significant since the transport operator is especially performing its own
financial services. It is widely believed that the cost of managing these
type of system is between 10% - 20% of fares collected on the system [14].
3. Lack of Interoperability: Due to their proprietary nature, these systems
are not compatible with each other. This also leads to vendor lock-in,
and switching to other vendors is expensive and complex because each
vendor has its own proprietary solution which must be implemented from
scratch.
4. Inconvenience for the Users: Users spend time queuing to top up their
media with value spendable on the system. The lack of interoperability
across these systems means that as they travel across different locations,
they will have to carry different ticketing media for the respective oper-
ators.
2.3.4 Open Ticketing Systems
The problems associated with closed-loop ticketing, and the high market pen-
etration of contactless bank cards makes a strong case for open ticketing sys-
tems. According to the UK Cards Association (UKCA), there are about 108
million contactless bank cards currently in issue in the UK alone [15]. Open
ticketing systems utilise the globally accepted and standardised payment in-
frastructure, and they use contactless payment devices. Contactless bank cards
and NFC-enabled mobile devices are suitable candidates because transactions
are quick and do not even require card-holder verification (see Section 3.5.2).
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This takes away accounting services from the transport operator, and is out-
sourced to the financial institutions, thereby allowing it to concentrate on its
core business of providing transport services.
Nevertheless, due to the requirements of transport ticketing (see Sec-
tion 5.5.1), some new concepts had to be introduced in payments, to accom-
modate open ticketing systems. Of significance are the concepts of delayed
authorisation and first time travel risk. In delayed authorisation, instead of
requesting authorisation for every transaction as usual, the transport operator
only acknowledges that the user’s device has been seen at various points on
the transport network. The evidence of the device’s usage on the transport
network is referred to as a ‘tap’, these taps are sent to the back-office. At the
back-office, all taps by the same user are aggregated at the end of the day,
and only then does the transport operator request authorisation of funds. The
apparent risk here is that a dishonest user can travel with no funds in their
account since authorisation is not done at the time of travel. We refer to this
as the first time travel risk. Currently, this risk is negotiated and accepted
between the transport operator and the bank issuers [16].
The advantages of open ticketing system are given below:
2.3.4.1 Advantages of Open Ticketing Systems
1. Cost Savings for Transport Operators: The Transport operator reduces
expenses in many instances. Firstly, there is no longer cost for issuing
and managing its own fare media since payment media issued by the
banks will be used. Costs are also saved due to reduction in customer
support since the operators no longer manage the payment media, and
can then focus on providing better ticketing-related support. By lever-
aging globally standardised and accepted infrastructure, the high costs
of certifying proprietary infrastructure are eliminated.
2. Ease of Deployment: Open systems are easier and faster to deploy since
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there will be no need to build one from scratch, leveraging on standards
makes deployment more straight forward.
3. Forms Basis for Interoperability: Open systems make interoperability
between different transport operators easier. It reduces the problem of
interoperability from the lack of technological compatibility, to a case of
business decision, which are always easier to get around.
4. More Established Security Mechanisms: Open systems explore the secu-
rity benefits provided by the well-established payment infrastructure.
The infrastructure also undergoes public scrutiny since they are not
based on proprietary solutions. Previous attacks on Mifare classic family
of smartcards [17, 18] show how the proprietary nature of systems can
affect security negatively.
5. Increased User Convenience: Users enjoy the convenience of not carrying
another payment medium just for ticketing. Also, users are not required
to queue to top up or buy tickets, this saves time and significantly im-
proves user experience. User convenience leads to increased ridership,
this is evident from TfL’s daily usage statistics since it launched open
ticketing (see Fig. 2.1).
2.3.4.2 Disadvantages of Open Ticketing Systems
1. Terminal Certifications: Terminals handling payment data are required
to undergo EMV and Payment Card Industry (PCI) certifications [19–21]
before they are deployed in the field. This is to ensure their ability to
process data correctly and feed it into the payment network without
integration problems. EMV certifications are known to be a daunting
process for any organisation to embark on, especially for the first time
[22].
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Use of Contactless Payment Cards on Bus and Rail
Produced by Customer Experience Analytics
Contactless Payment Cards
Contactless payment cards can be used to travel on buses, Tube, tram, Docklands Light Railway (DLR), London Overground and most National Rail services in London. 
The chart below shows the number of contactless payment cards used on buses since December 2012 and on rail since 16 September 2014. It shows the number of unique cards used per day 
and average journeys per day by each mode. 
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Figure 2.1: Use of Contactless Payment Cards on Bus and Rail [1]
2. Initial Capital Expenditure: As is the case with any investment, there is
usually a high initial cost incurred. Open ticketing is not an exception
in this aspect. The cost of upgrading the terminals and certifying them
is significant. Table 2.1 shows examples of the cost of open ticketing
implementations around the world. It is worth noting, however, that
the costs vary, depending how mature the technological infrastructure
is, before implementing open ticketing. If a closed-loop system is already
in place, then savings can be made on the terminals and communication
device for example.
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2.4 Ticketing System Requirements
Requirements differ across different ticketing system models, for example, open
ticketing systems typically have fewer requirements than close ticketing sys-
tems, and even less for ABT systems. This is because in open payments,
ticketing processes rely on some of the provisions of the payment instrument
itself, for example, the transaction between the device and the contactless
reader are governed by the same standards (EMV) as that of regular pay-
ments, say in retail for example. Nevertheless, the requirements of ticketing
systems can largely be divided into three categories; security, functional, and
privacy requirements. Functional requirements are those requirements that do
not necessarily affect the security of the system, but nonetheless affects the ef-
ficiency, performance and procedural aspects of the system. The requirements
presented in the following sections do not represent the requirements any tick-
eting solution. Rather, a generic overview of the major ticketing requirements
found in existing literature is provided.
2.4.1 Security Requirements
1. Integrity: Tickets or ticketing credentials should not be modified with-
out being detected. All participants involved in the ticketing ecosystem
should be able to verify that the tickets or related credential is accurate
and complete since it was generated by its legitimate source.
In open systems, the integrity checks provided by EMV can be relied
upon. Specifically, the data authentication phase provides assurances
that the data in the payment device hasn’t been modified. See Sec-
tion 3.5.1.
2. Authentication: No unauthorised user or unauthorised ticketing creden-
tial should have access to the transport system. Arguably this is the
most important requirement from the transport operator’s perspective
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because it is directly linked to revenue generation and it could lead to
potential avenues for Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks.
3. Non-repudiation: Any participant involved in any ticketing transaction,
cannot deny involvement at a later stage. This requirement applies to
different aspects. For pre-paid tickets, the issuer should not be able to
deny generating tickets, and users should not be able to maliciously deny
using a ticket. This requirement is closely linked with non-overspending
explained below.
For account-based systems, this requirement becomes even more neces-
sary since establishment of fares relies on the evidence that the payment
device interacted with the ticketing system at various points.
4. Non-overspending: A user should only be able to use tickets as stipulated
in the contract with the transport operator. Tickets should be used
within their validity as agreed on, or paid for by the user. In this context
validity may include attributes such as distance, time, and geographical
boundaries or a combination of these attributes. This requirement is
also referred to as unforgeability in some proposals [23, 24]. For PAYG
ticketing, users should not be able to access the transport service without
the minimal necessary value in the payment device. It is important to
note that for closed-loop, card-based systems, overspending is checked
for prior to travel (verification phase). And if detected, travel is denied.
In account-based ticketing, however, overspending can only be detected
at a later stage when the user’s travels are aggregated since all users with
a valid payment device are allowed at least their ‘first travel’ (first time
travel risk) (See Section 5.5). In such cases, blacklisting is relied upon
to detect further usage by the same user or payment device, depending
on if the ticket is transferable.
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5. Blacklistability: It should be possible to detect and deny dishonest users
from further travel or interaction with the ticketing system. The black-
listing requirements is the transport operators first line of defence against
compromised user devices or dishonest users. In this context, a dishon-
est user may be a user in possession of a stolen device, a compromised
device or a case of over-spending by a user. In addition, in account-based
ticketing, the importance of blacklisting becomes even more significant
because there is a direct monetary value involved. Blacklisting is neces-
sary to deter users from taking advantage of the ‘first time travel risk’.
6. Exculpability: It should not be possible for a transport operator to
falsely accuse the user of overspending. The exculpability requirement
has its origins in group digital signatures [25] and it was informally de-
fined by Bellare et al. [26] as: Neither a group manager or any of the
group members can sign on behalf of any of the group members. Excul-
pability in the context of ticketing therefore provides assurances that the
transport operator will not falsely accuse a user of over spending [27].
Exculpability also encompasses the ability of the user to prove his tickets
have been validated prior to usage [28].
7. Anti-Pass-back: Pass-back in ticketing is a fraudulent act where a user
enters a transport system with a valid ticket, and then immediately
passes the device back to a second user who also taps and get validated
by the system. From a review of some of the existing ticketing proposals
[29–31] and discussions with major stakeholders in the industry, two
general ways for detecting pass-back have been identified. Anti pass-
back can be at the ‘ticket-level’ where the reader writes back data to the
ticket –a time-stamp for example– so that pass-back can be identified.
Anti pass-back can also be detected at the ‘station-level’, in which case
the terminals keep a record of all tickets they have validated within a
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specific amount of time. Station-level anti pass-back is especially useful
for ticketing systems that cannot modify the ticket on the fly, such as in
barcode ticketing.
2.4.2 Functional Requirements
1. Efficiency: In the context of ticketing, efficiency is the level of user
throughput by the terminal during ticket validation. This is directly
related to the transaction time of the validation protocol, including any
processing delays and also taking into account delays on the physical
layer. The requirement is for the transaction to be completed in 300
- 500 milliseconds [32, 33]. Maintaining a high-level of user through-
put is important because it affects user satisfaction and congestion may
lead to health and safety hazards. The payment industry also requires
contactless payments to be less the 500 milliseconds [34–36].
2. Oﬄine Verification: The transaction between a device and a terminal
should be fully oﬄine. It should be possible to validate if the user is
allowed to travel including a blacklist check oﬄine. This is because it
is difficult to guarantee connectivity in some cases such as underground
train stations, or mobile vehicles (Buses). Connecting to a back-end also
introduces latency to the transaction speed, which may be too costly for
the overall efficiency of the system. The oﬄine verification requirement
is also referred to as versatility by some authors [24].
2.4.3 Privacy Requirements
It is important for any ticketing system to protect the privacy of users. Ex-
amples of threat to privacy include:
1. Unauthorised User Identification: Either through direct personal identi-
fiers, or indirect identifiers such as user journey data.
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2. User Profiling: It should not be possible to track the journeys of users,
or to identify which user is making what journey.
The threats to privacy give rise to the following requirements, also referred
to as the privacy protection goals [37]:
1. Anonymity: Users should be able to buy and use their tickets with-
out disclosing their identity. This requires the identity of users to be
preserved throughout the ticketing phases. However, according to the
payment model used, this might be a difficult requirement to achieve
because users’ could be identified at the point of ticket purchase [38].
2. Unlinkability: It should not be possible to link multiple journeys made
by a user. The unlinkability requirement is closely related to anonymity,
but it goes a step further. There is a possibility of tracing the journeys of
users even when they are anonymous. This could allow an unauthorised
entity to build profiles of users.
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 Transport Operator Value of Contract (and dates) Comments 
Chicago Transit 
Authority (CTA) 
  
Initially $454 million awarded 
to Cubic (increased to $519 
million due to add-ons) to 
transition the Ventra system to 
open ticketing (2011) 
12-year contract to provide 
terminals, vending machines, 
and communication devices. 
Also includes upgrades on 
about 1800 buses, and over 
770 rail gates. 
Washington 
Metropolitan Area 
Transit Authority 
(WMATA) 
Accenture was awarded the 
contract worth $184 million to 
transition open ticketing (2014) 
5-year to include 1000 
terminals for rail, 450 ticket 
vending machines, 1500 bus 
terminals and 160 terminals 
for parking. 
Singapore’s Land & 
Transport Authority 
(LTA) 
Awarded a $1.9 million contract 
to Orange Business Services for 
open ticketing. 
To include a back-office, 
management services, and 
payment gateway. 
South-eastern 
Pennsylvania 
Transportation 
Authority (SEPTA) 
Awarded a $129.5 million 
contract to ACS Transport 
Solutions for open ticketing. 
(2011) 
SEPTA have the option of 
buying $83 million worth of 
additional services like fare 
collection and data 
management, after system 
installation. 
Budapesti 
Közlekedési Központ 
(BKK) Centre for 
Budapest Transport 
Contract awarded to Scheidt & 
Bachman for an open ticketing 
system. Worth 91 million 
pounds over 5 years. (2014) 
To include:  Back office, 2100 
terminals on buses and 120 
terminals for rail. 
Also includes 700 portable 
hand-held terminals 
 
Dallas Area Rapid 
Transit 
(DART)  
 
Awarded a $30 million contract 
to VIX Technologies for an 
account-based, open ticketing 
system. (2015) 
VIX to provide “Easy and 
Open”, its in-house developed 
open ticketing solution. 
Transport 
for New South Wales 
(TfNSW) 
Awarded a $7.6 million contract 
to Cubic Corporation to trial an 
open ticketing solution. (2016) 
Trials scheduled to begin in 
2017 
Table 2.1: Trends in Open Ticketing
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2.5 Notable Ticketing System
Implementations in the UK
There are numerous examples of ticketing system implementations around the
world. In this section, a description of the two predominant ticketing solutions
in the UK is given. A highlight of trends in ticketing from transport operators
is given in Table 2.1.
2.5.1 Integrated Transport Smartcard Organisation
(ITSO)
ITSO is a membership-based organisation made up of public authorities, trans-
port operators, and ticketing equipment suppliers in the UK. The key objec-
tives of ITSO is the development and maintenance of the ITSO specifications
which aims to deliver integrated and interoperable smart ticketing across the
UK. ITSO also conducts testing and certification of components to ensure
compliance to the ITSO specification [39].
The specification itself is in parts, covering the different components of
ITSO necessary to deliver a smart ticketing solution. The keys parts include:
Customer Media (CM)
Initially the specification focused on smartcards, but has since evolved to make
provision for other smart devices [39].
Point Of Sale Terminal (POST)
This is essentially a smartcard terminal, used to communicate with CM [40].
The POSTs are also connected to the back-offices to ensure reporting of trans-
action data.
Host Operator or Processing System (HOPS)
The HOPS carries out the back-office processes such as message handling and
accounting functions [41].
Message Data Elements and Structures
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Customer Media
ITSO supports both cards and 
smart phones
ITSO Product Entity (IPE) 
Single or multiple products 
(tickets) in an ITSO application
ITSO Application (Shell)
Single or multiple ITSO 
applications on a CM
Figure 2.2: Layout of ITSO Ticketing Media
This is to ensure a common data structure and uniform data record definitions
are used across all ITSO complaint implementations [42]. The security-related
message flow between ITSO components is specified in [43].
ITSO Secure Access Module (ISAM)
ITSO mandates that both POSTS and HOPS have Secure Access Modules
(SAM)4 embedded, ISAM for the HOPS is referred to as a HSAM. The SAM
is used to validate CMs and the data they hold, generate cryptographic keys,
and store sensitive data to retrieve later.
The ITSO specification logically separates the fare media into three layers
as shown in Fig. 2.2.
ITSO is a closed-loop based system and individual transport operators
have to make provisions for their own payment functionality [44]. ITSO is a
card-based solution with and supports pre-purchased and season tickets. It
also supports PAYG ticketing. There are ongoing trials to enable ITSO on
mobile devices through HCE.
4The SAM is typically in the form of an ID-000 punched smartcard, with a dedicated
crypto-processor
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2.5.2 Transport for London (TfL) Oyster Card
TfL, under the leadership of the Mayor of London, is the government body
that is responsible for transport in London. This includes journeys on buses,
trains, trams, ferries and bicycles. It also regulates taxis and other private
car hire services in London. In 2003, TfL introduced a contactless card to be
used for travel in London, known as the Oyster Card. There have been over
100 million oyster cards issued till date5 [45]. The Oyster card can be used for
rail, bus, tram and ferry travel in London. Until January 2010, Oyster cards
were initially based on NXP’s Mifare classic cards, but have since moved on to
Mifare DESFire cards, due to security vulnerabilities discovered in the Mifare
classic cards. The Oyster card supports season tickets and PAYG ticketing
with daily price capping. Capping is a feature of PAYG whereby once the
user’s daily spend reaches a certain limit, further travel is free for the rest of
the day.
The Oyster card system itself is based on a proprietary architecture and
the contactless terminals were supplied by Cubic Transport Systems. However
in 2012, TfL began transition to an ABT, open-loop ticketing and began ac-
cepting contactless bank cards on buses, followed by trains in 2014. Now over
two million journeys are made daily, using contactless bank cards on the TfL
network [1]. The system has since been extended to support mobile payments
such as Apple Pay and Android Pay, and other implementations conforming
to the EMV specification.
5This includes regular Oyster cards, Oyster photo-cards issued to those eligible for free
or discounted travel, and the Visitor Oyster, tailored specifically for visitors.
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2.6 Summary
This chapter presents a general background for ticketing systems. The evo-
lution of the ticketing fare media, from the days of cash, to the current use
of contactless technology has been highlighted. The general architecture, as
well as the participants and phases of transport ticketing systems has been
presented. This chapter also looks at the classification of ticketing systems,
which lays a foundation on which significant parts of this thesis is built upon.
Finally, a highlight of some of the ticketing implementations as well as the
current trends from around the world is presented. The next chapter presents
a background of technologies that are relevant to the work in this thesis.
46
Chapter 3
Background II: Technical
Background
3.1 Near Field Communication
Near Field Communication (NFC) [46] is a short range contactless commu-
nication technology which enables the exchange of data between devices. It
typically works within the range of less than 10 cm and at a Radio Frequency
(RF) of 13.56 MHz. An NFC device may either be passive or active. An active
NFC device (known as the initiator) is capable of producing its own Radio Fre-
quency RF-field and directly transmitting data, while a passive NFC device
(known as a target or a tag) relies on the initiator’s RF-field for power and
clock through load modulation, for data transmission. The communication
between the two entities is half-duplex, meaning only one entity can send at a
time. NFC is standardised by the NFC Forum [47] and is based on legacy stan-
dards such as ISO/IEC 14443 [5] and the European Computer Manufacturers
Association (ECMA) [48] standards. NFC works in three different operating
modes; Reader/Writer Mode, Peer-to-Peer Mode, and Card Emulation Mode.
3.1.1 NFC Modes of Operation
1. Peer-to-Peer Mode: This mode enables a two-way communication to
be established between two NFC-enabled devices. Both devices serve
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as an active entity and can initiate a communication and send data
alternatively as ‘peers’. The physical and data link layer of this mode
are standardised in ISO/IEC 18092 [49]. This mode is usually used for
quick exchange of small data, such as business cards and contacts.
2. Reader/Writer Mode:
This mode enables an active NFC-enabled device to either read data
from a tag or write data to it. This is typically used as information
points in public places, for example smart posters for users to scan and
access bus timetables on their devices.
3. Card Emulation Mode:
The majority of the work presented in this thesis is based on this mode
of operation. As the name suggests, an NFC-enabled device in this mode
is capable of emulating a smartcard, and exchanging data in the form of
Application Protocol Data Units (APDU)1 with an external smartcard
terminal. From the terminal’s point of view, the mobile device appears
and behaves like any other smartcard. There are two ways of performing
card emulation: Card emulation using an SE, and Host Card Emulation.
These are discussed in the coming sections.
1APDU is the unit of communication between a smartcard and a terminal.
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3.2 Card Emulation Using A Security
Element
Mobile Device
NFC 
Controller
Secure 
Element
Host OS
Ticketing 
App 
Transport
Operator
TSM
Store App
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Issue Ticketing App
And Tickets
NFC Transaction (Ticket Presentment)
APDUs
Ticketing
Terminal
Figure 3.1: NFC SE Ecosystem
Near Field Communication (NFC) in card emulation mode, permits a mo-
bile device to emulate a contactless smartcard and exchange APDUs with an
external contactless terminal. From the card terminal’s point of view, the
mobile device appears and behaves like any other smartcard. Traditionally,
NFC card emulation mode has relied on a tamper-resistant hardware SE to
provide security protection. This is because the host OS cannot provide the
level of application security required in certain use-cases, such as payments
and ticketing. The SE provides a secure storage and execution environment
for the applications emulating the smartcard. When an NFC emulation de-
vice is tapped on a terminal, command APDUs from the terminal are received
by the NFC controller, via the NFC channel, and are routed to the SE as
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shown in Fig. 3.1. However, the use of an SE introduces practical constraints
for an application developer and/or a service provider. Access to the SE is
tightly controlled by the Mobile Network Operators (MNO) and/or the Origi-
nal Equipment Manufacturer (OEM), requiring complex business agreements
before an application or related data is provisioned to the SE.
While card emulation has proven to be attractive for applications such as
mobile payments and transport ticketing, the tight control on the SE means
small companies and mobile application developers have no access to the ser-
vices of the SE and indeed the ability to use the NFC card emulation func-
tionality. This has hindered the use of NFC phones and prevented usage from
reaching its full potential. There have been moves to resolve this by using
a Trusted Service Manager (TSM), although this has not been universally
adopted by businesses and standards. The TSM provides secure application
provision and personalisation services, key management services as well as
post-issuance lifecycle management.
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3.3 Host Card Emulation
Host Card Emulation (HCE) [50] is a means by which an application running
on the OS of the device, can emulate a smartcard, and communicate with a
contactless terminal. This means that the NFC controller is effectively able to
route APDUs to the application directly, bypassing the SE. This is depicted in
Fig. 3.2. Therefore in HCE, security (attack resistance) is traded to facilitate
NFC service development.
Research In Motion (RIM), on the Blackberry platform [51], were the first
to incorporate this functionality in their phones. Subsequently Cyanogen-
mod integrated some patches [52] to the Android OS which permitted NFC
enabled mobile phones to perform card emulation from the host. However,
HCE attracted most attention when Google incorporated it within Android
4.4 (KitKat). The incorporation of HCE into Android has significant impact
on the NFC Ecosystem considering Android phones account for about 88% of
the global market share [53].
The key benefit of HCE is that anybody can implement an application that
emulates a smartcard, which eliminates dependence on the SE. This opens up
the NFC ecosystem to developers and businesses at no extra cost. HCE’s im-
pact on security cannot be ignored. The potential security issues are presented
in the form of a threat model below.
3.3.1 HCE Application Development: Android
Example
Android’s HCE architecture is centred around Android services known as
“HCE Services”. Services have behaviours that are suitable for HCE applica-
tions for use in areas such as ticketing and payments. A service can run in
the background and does not need user interference to operate. This means
a user can simply tap the device against a terminal for the transaction to
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go through, without necessarily launching the application. The implementa-
tion of an Android-based HCE application involves two stages; Application
Selection and Data Exchange.
3.3.2 Application Selection
In a case where there is more than one HCE application on the device, appli-
cation selection ensures that the correct application responds when the device
is tapped against a terminal. All HCE applications running on the OS are
identified using the Application Identifier (AID). The AID is registered at
the beginning of development in the Android manifest file. The first com-
mand APDU received by the NFC controller is the SELECT command. The
SELECT command contains the AID of the application that the external ter-
minal wishes to communicate with. The NFC controller looks up the AID in
its routing table and makes a decision on which application the AID is for.
Subsequently, all further APDUs are sent to the corresponding application
until a new SELECT command is received or the NFC link is broken [54].
3.3.3 Data Exchange
Card emulation using HCE requires the application to have a service compo-
nent that handles NFC Transactions. All services extend the HostApduService.
The HostApduService declares two abstract methods that as a minimum, are
overridden and implemented. (Example code is shown in Listing Section 3.3.3.)
public class MyHostApduService extends HostApduService {
@Override
public byte[] processCommandApdu(byte[] apdu, Bundle extras) {
...
}
@Override
public void onDeactivated(int reason) {
...
}
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}The processCommandApdu() method is called whenever the service re-
ceives a command APDU from an NFC terminal. Response bytes should be
sent back almost immediately for a seamless user experience because the user
will most likely be holding the device against the NFC terminal [50]. Other-
wise, the response can be sent later using the sendResponseApdu() method.
The onDeactivated() method is called when the NFC link is broken for any
reason, or when a new SELECT command with a different AID is received.
The onBind() method is used to return the communication channel to the ser-
vice. The notifyUnhandled() is used to notify the OS when the service cannot
complete the transaction.
3.3.4 NFC Applications Requirements
1. Security: Although specific requirements may vary from one case to the
other, it is important to put strong security measures in place. The
security of NFC applications is no different from the fundamentals of
information security: Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability (CIA).
To use an NFC ticketing application as an example, the ticketing, pay-
ment, and cryptographic data must be safeguarded against unauthorised
disclosure and modification both at rest and at run-time, and the transit
system should be available for use at all times.
2. Performance: The performance of NFC-based transaction must be signif-
icantly fast in order to maintain high throughput and maintain overall
user satisfaction; both the payment and the transit industries require
that a transaction is completed within the range of 300-500 millisec-
onds [32,55].
3. Flexibility: The use of NFC applications must not introduce rigidity to
the ecosystem. For example, the case of card emulation using the SE
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is rigid because provisioning an application into the SE requires per-
missions from the ‘owner’ of the SE, which in most cases is not easy.
This means developers and researchers find it very difficult to make use
of these services without signing contracts with various stakeholders.
Therefore, an effective NFC solution must be flexible and work out-of-
the-box.
4. Complexity: The complexity of the ecosystem should be as simple as
possible. A complex ecosystem leads to increased implementation times
and added cost. For example, the Trusted Service Manager (TSM) model
used to provision applications to the SE increases complexity tremen-
dously. A TSM is a trusted third party whose responsibility it is to
facilitate provisioning, and to manage the entire life-cycle of the service.
The inclusion of these extra parties makes it more complex and also more
expensive because these services are not free.
5. Low Power Mode: In low power mode, the device’s OS is shut down
due to ‘low’ battery and therefore appears odd to the user; however,
the Power Management Integrated Circuit (PMIC) is still on and can
facilitate NFC transactions with help of power generated by the terminal
in the field.2
6. Connectivity: Some NFC applications may require connectivity for ev-
ery transaction, while some may only require connectivity from time to
time, to update credentials. For example, some applications will require
access to storage in the cloud for every transaction, while others may
use tokenisation, and only require periodic connectivity to request new
tokens.
2Low power mode should not be confused with “battery off mode” where even the PMIC
has no power
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7. Tamper-Resistance: NFC applications require protection against modi-
fications and reverse-engineering by malicious entities. Software tamper-
resistant techniques such as obfuscation and other techniques are used by
developers to achieve this, although these techniques are usually costly
in terms of performance and code size [56]. Other ways involve installing
the NFC application and related data into a tamper-resistant physical
silicon such as the SE.
8. Interoperability: In the context of this thesis, it represents the ability to
host NFC applications on different devices from different vendors. This
ensures the NFC ecosystem operates in a cohesive and efficient manner.
9. Standardised APIs and Ease of Development: The availability of stan-
dardised APIs goes a long way to easing the development process of NFC
applications, thereby shortening the overall deployment time. Standard-
ised APIs also ensure that developers adhere to software engineering
global best practices, which is beneficial to the overall security fabric.
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3.4 EMV Payment Technology
EMV represents Europay, MasterCard and Visa, the three companies3 that
initially constituted EMVCo, an organisation tasked with creating the tech-
nical specifications for chip-card payments (also known as Chip&PIN). Due
to advances in mobile technology, the specifications have been extended to
include other form factors, such as smartphones.
Prior to the introduction of chip-cards, magstripe cards were used for pay-
ments. Magstripe cards are vulnerable to data skimming and cloning [57],
because they use static payment data. The chip-cards however are capable
of performing cryptographic operations on dynamic data during transactions,
thereby protecting against fraud.
1. More reliable methods of card-holder verification.
2. Robust risk management parameters.
3. Transaction integrity through the use of cryptograms.
4. Card authentication to protect against counterfeiting.
The aforementioned features are further elaborated in Section 3.5. EMV relies
on application cryptograms generated using two-key triple DES algorithms to
encrypt critical data elements used in the transaction. A cryptogram is the
term used for a digital signature in EMV, and table Table 3.1 gives a summary
of the different cryptograms and their functions.
3The membership of EMV has since grown to include other companies such as Discover,
American Express and China UnionPay.
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Figure 3.3: EMV Payment Architecture
Table 3.1: EMV Cryptograms
Cryptogram Function Origin
ARQC Request for transaction to go online for authorisation Device
ARPC Response to online authorisation request to device Issuer
TC Generated at the end of approved transactions Device
AAC Generated when a transaction is declined Device
3.4.1 EMV Architecture
The EMV follows the “four corner model” as shown in Fig. 3.3. It includes the
merchant to whom the card is presented for a payment by the card-holder 4.
The merchant forwards the transaction data to his bank, which is referred to
as the Acquirer. The Acquirer requests authorisation of payment from the
issuing bank through a payment network. The issuing bank (or issuer) is the
bank with which the card-holder has an account, and thus the bank that issued
the card.
4The term card-holder is not exclusive to payment with cards, it also includes mobile
devices.
58
3.4.2 EMV Primary Account Number
Figure 3.4: Anatomy of the PAN
Also referred to as card number, the PAN is a 16-19 digit number that serves
as the payment device identifier of an EMV-compliant card or application and
is uniquely issued as standardised in ISO/IEC 7812 [58]. From left to right, the
first digit is the Major Industry Identifier (MII), with ‘4’, ‘5’ and ‘6’ reserved
for the payment industry. The first few digits including the MMI make up
the Bank Identification Number (BIN) which identifies the type of card. The
next digits excluding the last digit represent the account number, and the
last digit is a checksum which is calculated using the ‘Luhn check’. The luhn
check is a simple checksum to verify the validity of identifiers including PANs,
first described by Hans Peter Luhn of IBM in a patent [59] and standardised
in [58]. The structure of the PAN is depicted in Fig. 3.4
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3.5 EMV Key Concepts
A typical EMV transaction involves three key concepts; Data Authentication,
Card-Holder Verification, and Transaction Authorisation. These are explained
in detail below.
3.5.1 Data Authentication
Data authentication is a way of verifying if the payment device presented
to the terminal is legitimate and not a counterfeit. Data authentication can
either be online or oﬄine. In online authentication, an internet connection is
required to send transaction-specific data to the issuer for verification. There
are three types of oﬄine data authentication as explained below.
1. Static Data Authentication (SDA): The SDA verifies that the ‘static’
data on the card has not been manipulated since provisioned by the
issuer. During a transaction, the terminal uses the issuer’s public key
to verify the cryptogram against the card data. SDA doesn’t provide
protection against card skimming because it uses static data and an
attacker can skim the cryptogram and place it in a counterfeit card.
2. Dynamic Data Authentication (DDA): In DDA, a transaction-specific
cryptogram is generated dynamically by the card using its own private
key. During a transaction, the terminal generates a random number and
sends it to the card. The card in turn generates a cryptogram which
includes the random number. Successful verification of the cryptogram
by the terminal provides assurances that the card data has not been
manipulated. But even more importantly, it proves that the card is not
counterfeit since it is infeasible to extract keys from the chip of a card.
3. Combined Data Authentication (CDA): CDA is a variation of DDA, and
it uses a special cryptogram referred to as the Application Cryptogram
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(AC). Similar to the case of DDA, the card must be capable of public key
cryptography which is typically done using the RSA algorithm. But in
CDA, the card generates the AC dynamically later during the protocol
to prove that the card that performed the authentication initially is the
same card authorizing the transaction.
3.5.2 Card-Holder Verification
Also referred to as Card-Holder Verification Method (CVM), this method is
used to ascertain that the person presenting the payment device is indeed the
legitimate card-holder. During the transaction, the terminal checks the CVM
list which holds logic on which CVMs the payment device supports in order of
priority. The CVMs supported by EMV in order of their security are; online
PIN, oﬄine PIN, user-biometric, signature, combination of two or no CVM at
all. There are also options for the PIN to either be in plaintext or encrypted
in both online and oﬄine cases.
3.5.3 Transaction Authorisation
EMV Transactions can either be authorised online or oﬄine. This is decided
as a result of processes taken at this stage, as listed below:
• Terminal Risk Management: The goal here is to prevent fraud using
mechanisms such as floor limits checking and random transaction selec-
tion [60]. Floor limits protects against overspending by making sure the
transaction is below a limit set by the acquirer. Random transaction
selection is when the terminal randomly makes an oﬄine transaction to
go online for authorisation.
• Terminal Action Analysis: The result of all the previous steps including
risk management is analysed by the terminal, and as a result then informs
the device if it prefers to finish the transaction oﬄine or go online.
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• Card Action Analysis: The device analyses the result of all previous
steps, and makes a decision on whether the transaction should go on-
line, be completed oﬄine, or declined. If the decision is to go online,
then a second card action analysis is carried out after the processing
to authenticate the data received from the issuer. In any case the de-
vice’s decision is communicated to the terminal by generating an Autho-
risation Request Cryptogram (ARQC), an Application Authentication
Cryptogram (AAC), or a Transaction Certificate (TC) cryptogram for
online, oﬄine or decline transaction respectively (see Table 3.1). The
decision of the card may differ from the decision taken by the terminal,
but ultimately the card’s decision is final.
• Transaction Completion: At the end of the processing in the previous
stage, the device may be requested to verify an Authorisation Response
Cryptogram (ARPC) from the issuer. The terminal may also carry out
script processing on the device based on the issuer’s commands. The user
is alerted to remove the device and settlement is requested assuming the
transaction was successful.
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3.6 EMV Considerations for Ticketing
Consideration Retail Payments 
 
Ticketing Payments 
Card-Holder 
Verification (CVM) 
 
A CVM method is 
required. e.g. PIN 
No CVM is required when a 
user taps the payment 
device 
Price to pay Known at the time of 
payments. 
Not known at the time of 
journey  
Payment Terminal 
Field 
Activated by the store 
attendant 
Always active, ready to be 
tapped by users 
 
 
 
Table 3.2: Payments: Retail vs Ticketing
As mentioned in Section 2.3.4, open ticketing systems rely on the user’s
payment card or device for ticketing. However, from a functional point of view
(see Section 5.5.1), ticketing payments differ from normal retail payments.
Therefore the payment industry considered these factors, and adopted new
rules to accommodate ticketing [61], Table 3.2 shows these considerations, in
comparison to ‘regular’ retail payments.
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3.7 EMV Payment Tokenisation
IssuerAcquirer Payment Network
Token Service Provider (TSP)
Merchant 
User
2. Merchant sends 
token to Acquirer
3. Acquirer routes 
the token via a 
Payment Network
4. Payment 
Network sends the 
token to the 
corresponding TSP 
for Detokenisation
5. TSP sends back 
the corresponding 
PAN for that token
6. The PAN is sent 
to the Issuer for 
authorisation
1. User initiates payment 
– token passed form their 
device
Figure 3.5: Transaction Flow of a Tokenised Payment
Tokenisation is a process of replacing sensitive data with a surrogate value
to limit exposure. This is particularly important for protecting data such
as payment data, health records or any Personally Identifiable Information
(PII)5. The surrogate value is usually short-lived and therefore is of minimal
importance to an attacker in case of a breach.
There have been various initiatives towards the standardisation of tokeni-
sation. The American National Standards Institute (ANSI), under the X9F1
group have ongoing development of a standard that covers tokenisation algo-
rithms for the financial industry [62].
The PCI Security Standards Council (SSC) also have guidelines for the
evaluation of tokenisation-related products and services including both hard-
ware and software components [63].
But the most relevant specification to the work presented in this thesis is
the EMV payment tokenisation. In this context, tokenisation replaces the PAN
with a short-lived, surrogate value referred to as a ‘token’ [64]. According to
EMVco “Tokenisation may be undertaken to enhance transaction efficiency,
5A PII is any information that could individually identify a perso.
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improve transaction security, increase service transparency, or to provide a
method for third-party enablement”.
EMVco introduces two new entities; the token requestor and the Token
Service Provider (TSP) to the existing payment network. The TSP is au-
thorised to generate, issue, and provision payment tokens to legitimate token
requestors. The TSP is also responsible for maintaining the PAN-token map-
ping in the token vault, as well as detokenisation, i.e. the translation of tokens
back to PANs for legitimate requests. Figure 3.5 shows the transaction flow
in an EMV tokenised transaction.
The EMVco does not limit the role of the token requestor to any one party,
perhaps to accommodate for different scenarios. The specification neverthe-
less specifies potential token requestors to include card issuers, digital wallet
providers, OEMs when acting as payment enablers and payment gateways on
behalf of merchants [64]. Prior to every token request, the specification re-
quires an Identification & Verification (ID&V) step to ensure its legitimacy.
(ID&V) methods include account verification6, card-holder verification by the
issuer etc.
6Account verification includes checks such as the so-called “$0 authorisation” to validate
that the PAN is legitimate and is active at its issuer.
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3.8 Summary
In this chapter, a general background is given for technologies that are relevant
to the work presented in this thesis. NFC and its different modes of operation,
particularly the two methods of card-emulation have been discussed. The
security mechanisms that can be used to reduce the attack resistance of HCE
applications will be discussed in Chapter 4. EMV as a payment technology
has also been described. EMV is relevant to this work because the move from
closed-loop to open systems increasingly puts the responsibility of ticketing
payments in the hands of the payment industry — which uses EMV as the
de facto standard — for these types of transactions. Finally, the concept of
tokenisation from EMV’s point of view has been discussed. Tokenisation is
important because it is the preferred security mechanism for handling the risks
of HCE in payments. More details on the impact of tokenisation in ticketing
is presented in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 4
Comparing SE and HCE
Capabilities
4.1 Introduction
The emergence of HCE has raised a lot of interest and concerns from both re-
search and industry communities. In many ways, HCE represents a sharp de-
viation from the traditional ways of performing contactless transactions with
a smartphone, and by extension the SE. The transport ticketing industry
relies heavily on smartcards and mobile technologies to facilitate and auto-
mate operations. In ticketing, HCE is a disruptive technology that offers
many advantages for users and Transport Operators (TOs). However, HCE
introduces some issues that call for scrutiny and careful consideration to en-
sure its success in ticketing. In this chapter, these issues are examined from
three perspectives: implementational considerations, security considerations,
and performance considerations. These factors affect the success of ticketing
schemes at all levels of the transport ticketing ecosystem. Implementational
considerations are issues that must be considered before a large-scale ticket-
ing scheme based on HCE is rolled out. It is a common misconception to
assume the transition from SE-based implementations to HCE-based ones is
a simple like-for-like change in technology. From a technical point of view,
this misconception is further exacerbated by the fact that, since HCE claims
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to emulate smartcard-based services, then everything should work out of the
box. While this is true to a large extent, there are some fundamental dif-
ferences between the two approaches, some of which are specific to transport
ticketing. In Section 4.3, these issues are looked at in more detail.
From a security point of view, there is no doubt of the magnitude of the
inherent security risks of the HCE approach. To counter the risks, numer-
ous security mechanisms have been proposed based on a generic assessment of
HCE. In Section 4.4, these security mechanisms are analysed with transport
ticketing in mind, to determine their feasibility in this area. Due to the secu-
rity and functional requirements of transport ticketing, there may be distinct
challenges that do not apply in other cases such as access control and mobile
payments. We look at these issues and determine the feasibility of the security
mechanisms in ticketing.
The performance of ticketing applications is paramount to the operation
of transport ticketing schemes. This is because they affect the throughput of
passengers at entry and exit points of the transport service, i.e. train sta-
tions or bus stops. There is a strict timing requirement with regards to ticket
and/or user verification at a terminal. While the performance of such applica-
tions on smartcards and SEs is a hot research topic, their HCE counterparts
have not undergone the same level of scrutiny. To that effect, in this chapter,
we implement two similar applications, on an SE and also in HCE. We test
these applications under laboratory conditions and present the results in Sec-
tion 4.6. We also highlight an interesting behaviour in HCE applications that
may call earlier assumptions into question and may jeopardise the security
and functionality of these applications.
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4.2 Related Work
There are many publications comparing the two approaches to card emulation
on mobile devices. In [65], Pannifer et al. compared HCE to UICC-SE, dis-
cussing the ecosystems for both approaches and providing a comparison based
on the provisioning infrastructure, usability, security and maturity of the tech-
nologies, as well as their business models. However, the comparison falls short
of any practical analysis, so no performance results were provided. In [51], the
author discussed the advantages and the security implications of HCE in com-
parison with an SE-based approach. However, there were no implementations
and thus performance measurements were not given.
In [66], Roland and Langer gave an overview of the three NFC modes,
and a relatively new concept of NFC communication referred to as the inverse
reader-mode, which departs from the norm of using NFC devices either in card
emulation or peer-to-peer mode to communicate with a terminal. First intro-
duced by Saminger et al. [67], the inverse reader-mode switches the roles of
the device and the terminal; therefore the NFC device will be in reader/writer
mode, and the terminal in card emulation mode. The main advantage of this
approach is that developers and Service Providers (SPs) can avoid the problem
of accessing the SE for card emulation, and instead can provide their services
in reader/writer mode, leaving that to the terminal. An appropriate analogy
for this concept is switching the roles of client and server. Similarly, the work
presented in [54, 68] analyses HCE from a security point of view, and sug-
gests countermeasures to deal with the identified security risks. However,the
work presented in [51,54,66–68] all fall short of practical implementations and
performance analysis.
Although not particularly related to HCE, there has been a substantial
amount of research on the feasibility of real-time applications on mobile de-
vices [69–72]. Real-time applications are computer applications or systems
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that require absolute response times. It is appropriate to consider transport
ticketing applications as ‘soft real-time’ applications1. The authors of [69–72]
agree that the Android OS is not appropriate for soft real-time applications
out-of-the-box. However, Alejandro et al. in [69] looked at the isolation of
CPU cores, which could be used to mitigate the magnitude of the variation
in performance of soft real-time applications. This concept is very similar to
the one used in this chapter. However, it is worth noting that the work in this
chapter was published before the solution presented in [69].
1Hard real-time applications are considered to have failed if they fail to respond within
the required response time e.g. Nuclear Systems. Soft real-time applications on the other
hand are not considered to have failed even if they don’t respond within the required time.
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4.3 Implementational Considerations
In this section, a comparison of HCE and SE-based approaches is provided.
The metrics used in the comparison represent the different Key Performance
Indicators (KPIs) that determine the success of a mobile-based transport tick-
eting implementation.
4.3.1 Ecosystem Complexity
The ecosystems of the two approaches as shown in are different. In the SE-
based approach, there is a Trusted Service Manager (TSM), which is a secure
and trusted entity that acts as a link between the Service Provider (in this case
the transport operator) and the SE itself. The TSM provides a secure technical
infrastructure for service providers to provision and manage their applications
in the SE remotely. In the HCE approach, however, the role of the TSM is
not required. Application provisioning here is straight-forward and the life-
cycle of the application and related credentials are solely the responsibility
of the transport operator. Therefore in terms of complexity, the HCE-based
approach offers a simpler ecosystem.
4.3.2 Provisioning
Provisioning in terms of the HCE application itself is relatively straight-
forward. The most practical way is to let users download the application
from the ‘app store’, as with other applications, since an interaction with the
MNO or any other third party is not required. In addition, if tokenisation is
used (see Section 3.7), then periodic tokens will have to be pushed to the de-
vice like a secure channel, Secure Socket Layer (SSL) for example. In addition
other security measures such as device authentication and user verification
prior to the provisioning of new tokens should not be neglected. This leads us
to the next point on usability.
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4.3.3 Usability
The usability of ticketing applications and procedures is paramount to the
success of the ticketing scheme. It is important to note that unlike an SE,
it is not possible to carry out a transaction with HCE applications when the
battery of the host device is drained and cannot power up the OS. This may
have a significant impact in ticketing, especially in rail ticketing where the
tap-in tap-out concept is used, and the fare is typically charged at the end of
the journey. The concern is the user’s device may be out of battery to tap-out.
Also, security measures taken may affect the usability of HCE applications.
As mentioned in Section 4.3.2, the validity of tokens and the user verification
method used will significantly affect usability. The ideal scenario would be for
new tokens to be provisioned to the device with minimal interactions with the
user.
4.3.4 Performance
The performance of applications in an SE-based approach is inherently slower
than similar HCE-based implementations. This is because SEs by design are
constrained devices, and have significantly lower processing power when com-
pared to the host device. However, performance testing carried out in this
chapter shows that HCE-based applications are prone to performance varia-
tion between transactions, making absolute performance benchmarking diffi-
cult. This can pose a challenge to ticketing, where timing is critical.
4.3.5 Cryptography
The cryptographic algorithms used for ticketing protocols in large-scale de-
ployments must be chosen carefully. For example the Android keystore system
only supports symmetric cryptography from API level 23 and above [73]. This
means about 66% of [74] user devices on the Android platform do not sup-
port symmetric algorithms, which is very significant. Therefore cryptographic
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compatibility must be considered when designing protocols for HCE-based
applications.
4.3.6 Cost
There is usually an additional costs incurred from the use of an SE. SE-owners2
require service providers to pay a determined ‘rental fee’ associated with hous-
ing their application in the SE. Service providers also pay for the cost of the
TSM infrastructure. In HCE, there is no need for the Service Provider to pay
for provisioning the application to the host device; however, risk mitigation
mechanisms associated with HCE-based implementations might incur a cost.
For example, if tokenisation is used there will be a cost determined by the
Token Service Provider (TSP).
4.3.7 Standardisation
The level of standardisation usually reflects the maturity of the technology.
The SE is backed by well-established standards and specification. The pro-
visioning and management of applications on an SE is standardised by Glob-
alPlatform [75]. The framework for the Universal Integrated Circuit Card
(UICC) as an SE is standardised by the Global System for Mobile Association
(GSMA) and the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI).
There are application-specific standards and specifications that also apply to
SEs such as EMVco and MIFARE. HCE on the other hand is a less mature
technology and therefore has less standardisation. Nevertheless, there are some
application-specific specifications such as those involved with Mastercard and
Visa.
2The SE-owner refers to the entity that holds access to the SE, which could be an MNO,
OEM, or Issuers depending on the SE form factor.
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4.4 Security Considerations
As discussed in Chapter 3, the security risks introduced by HCE are clear. To
that effect, a number of mechanisms have been proposed — both academic
and industry-led — to manage the security risks in HCE-based implementa-
tions [54,68,76–79]. In this section, an analysis of these security mechanisms is
carried out. Specifically, we look at how the adoption of these security mech-
anisms may impact ticketing, and highlight the considerations that must be
taken into account. A comparison of these mechanisms (including the Secure
Element) is given in Table 4.1.
4.4.1 Cloud Storage
By design, cloud-based transactions will require an internet connection be-
tween the users’ devices and the cloud server. In transport ticketing, an inter-
net connection is difficult to guarantee in certain scenarios such as underground
stations and moving vehicles. Therefore it is a strong requirement for trans-
port ticketing solutions to grant or deny users’ travel oﬄine. In addition, the
strict performance requirements of transport transactions may prove difficult
to achieve due to network latency. Form a security perspective cloud storage
shifts most of the security considerations from the mobile itself to the ‘cloud’.
Consequently, security considerations must be made around issues such as:
effective access control measures, isolation of the data stored in the cloud,
security of the data both in transit and at rest.
4.4.2 Tokenisation
Tokenisation replaces a long-term, security-sensitive piece of data with an item
of data that is short-lived and referred to as a token. In EMV, the main com-
ponent that is tokenised is the Primary Account Number (PAN). Tokenisation
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has shown a lot of promise. However, there are a few considerations neces-
sary for successful adoption in ticketing. Firstly, an internet connection is
needed to provision the device with a fresh token. Currently, the EMV spec-
ification [64] allows for both single-use and multiple-use tokens, and does not
specify the length of the validity of tokens. The validity of these tokens will
depend on the perceived risk of exposure on the device. It is unreasonable to
require an internet connection before every transaction because it is difficult to
guarantee connectivity in certain cases, such as at underground train stations.
Therefore the choice of the validity of tokens must take this into account. In
addition, the use of PANs has evolved beyond being a mere account identifier
to blacklist dishonest users. By using tokenised payments, blacklisting could
be compromised since it is expected that the token will be short-lived. More
on this is presented in Chapter 5.
In terms of security, tokenisation provides stronger security guarantees
than storing long-term credentials locally, since they have a shorter life-time,
and can even be restricted to use within specific use-cases, thereby reducing
the overall appetite for an attacker to get hold of tokens. However an ideal
situation would be to have an extra layer of security. Point-to-point encryption
and TEEs are good candidates to provide an extra layer of security.
4.4.3 Trusted Execution Environment (TEE)
A TEE provides a trusted area on the mobile device for secure data storage
and code execution. It also provides other security services such as remote
attestation, which could be useful for ticketing. With high market penetration,
TEEs provide acceptable levels of security and performance for application in
transport ticketing.
TEEs are, however, tightly controlled by the equipment manufacturers,
similarly to SEs. This tight control adds to the complexity of the ecosystem
because TEEs on devices cannot be used ‘out-of-the-box’ and will require
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permission in the form of contracts with the respective OEMs. This also leads
to an added economic cost in TEE adoption. This issue is looked at more
closely in Chapter 6.
4.4.4 White-Box Cryptography (WBC)
With ticketing being a time-critical service, white-box implementations are
slower than their black-box counterparts [80, 81]. This could jeopardise the
ability of ticketing applications to meet the performance requirement. More
importantly, it has been shown that WBC implementations are vulnerable
to several types of attacks. For example the white-box DES and AES im-
plementations presented in [82] and [83] respectively have been proven to be
susceptible to numerous attacks as presented in [84,85]. As improved variants,
some proposals have adopted the use of external encoding to provide some sort
of shield. However, even the proposals adopting external encoding have proven
to be vulnerable to cryptanalysis as shown in [86] and in [87]. WBC shows
much promise for application in transport ticketing. However, its performance,
security issues, proprietary nature and lack of robust standardisation makes
large-scale adoption a challenge.
Table 4.1: Comparison of Security Mechanisms
SE TEE Cloud-HCE White-Box Crypto Tokenisation
Security High Medium Medium Medium Medium
Performance High High Medium Medium Medium
Flexibility Low Low Medium Proprietary High
Connectivity No No Yes No Yesa
Standardised API Yes Yes No No Yes
Interoperability Yes No No No Yes
Tamper Resistance High Medium Medium Medium Medium
Set-up Cost Yes Yes Yes Yes Minimalb
a Connectivity is required periodically, when new tokens are provisioned.
b Initial set-up cost is minimal. There is a running cost of provisioning new tokens to device.
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4.5 Considerations of HCE Performance
This section provides a comparative analysis of the performance of HCE and
SE-based applications. This is achieved by implementing similar applications
(in terms of functionality), on an SE and in HCE. Their performance is anal-
ysed both in terms of computation and the transfer delays on the NFC com-
munication link. The results raise some issues that could have an impact on
the use of mobile devices in ticketing.
4.5.1 Android CPU Policy
Android devices typically have a multi-core processor design. This means
that a single unit can consist of two or more independent CPUs referred to as
cores. Android devices use both the ARM and x86 architectures. Android also
uses the Symmetric Multiprocessing (SMP) design for managing the different
CPUs [88]. Normally, all CPUs share the same CPU frequency policy, i.e.
all CPUs are online at the same time and any process can run on any of
them. However, Android devices switch between different frequency levels
in response to variable CPU load; this is enforced and regulated by a driver
known as the CPU governor [89]. There are several types of CPU governors
with different characteristics. For this work, the ondemand governor which
is the factory default for most Android phones, increases and decreases CPU
frequency according to demand. We also used the userspace governor: it
permits a user to choose which frequency state the CPU should run in.
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4.5.2 Test Methodology
Table 4.2: Devices Used in Testing
Device Manufacturer Operating System RAM ROM
SE (Nokia) NXP SmartCafe expert 3.1 4kb 160kb
Phone (Nexus 5) LG Electronics Android Kit-Kat 4.4 2GB
Laptop SONY Vaio Ubuntu 14.04.1 4GB
Card Reader SCM
In this section we explain how the testing was set up and conducted. To test
performance with regard to variable delays, we developed two card-emulating
applications. The first one was a Java card applet based on the Java card
framework v2.2.1 [90]. We refer to this applet as the SE-app. We loaded the
SE-app into the SE of a Nokia 6131 (one of the first NFC phones). Nokia,
in [91] provides a tutorial on how to use the ‘Nokia NFC Unlock Service
MIDlet’ to unlock the SE of the Nokia 6131. The second application was
an Android application (HCE-app), running on Android platform version 4.4
with Android framework Application Programming Interface (API) level 19
as the target API. This application was deployed in a Nexus 5 mobile device.
Table 4.2 provides a summary of the devices used to conduct the testing.
Both applications ran the same cryptographic protocol designed for the
tests. The purpose of the protocol is simply to require the emulating processor
to carry out some non-trivial and representative cryptographic processing. The
javacardx.crypto package was used for the SE-app, and the java.crypto package
for the HCE-app.
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Device Terminal
SELECT AID
0X9000
encrypt APDU11bytes
Ciphertext
sign APDU8bytes
signature
Figure 4.1: Protocol Used in Testing
A 1024-bit RSA algorithm keypair was used, and to simplify testing, we
departed from cryptographic best practice not only by using this key size,
but also by using the same pair for both encryption and signing. For the
encryption we used the ALG RSA PKCS1 field of the cipher class from the
javacardx.crypto package. ALG RSA PKCS1 uses the RSA cipher for encryp-
tion and the Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS1) (v1.5) for data
padding. For the signature, we used ALG RSA SHA PKCS1 field of the ci-
pher class from the javacardx.crypto package. ALG RSA SHA PKCS1 firstly
computes a hash of the message resulting in a 20 byte SHA digest, which is
then padded using the PKCS1 before signing using the RSA algorithm.
We recognise that SHA-1 is no longer recommended; however the goal
was to test performance variation rather than establish a secure protocol.
For performance testing, we first used the Java timer class in the terminal
application to take measurements. To ensure accuracy of the values produced
by the timer in our program, we then used the CLT Move-Contactless Spy tool
from COMPRION [92] to double-check the measurements. This tool monitors
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the flow of APDUs between the terminal and the phone, giving a byte-level
view of messages and their corresponding delays.
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4.6 Experimental Results
The first phase of any communication between a smartphone and a terminal
is the initialisation and anti-collision phase; this [46] is where they establish
identities and agree on the parameters of communication for all subsequent
messages. The parameters include the number of bits they can handle at a
time and also the agreed amount of time the terminal has to wait for a response
from the phone before it times out, known as the Frame Waiting Time (FWT).
The anti-collision phase exists to resolve the situation of multiple smartcards
within range of a single terminal, which was not the case for our tests.
After a successful initialisation and anti-collision, the terminal application
selects the applet by sending a select APDU using the AID; the application
sends back the 0x9000 status word if the select APDU was successful. The
terminal then sends a command APDU (ENCRYPT) with an 11-byte data
to be encrypted by the card-emulating application. The application encrypts
the message and sends back a response APDU containing the corresponding
cipher text together with the 0x9000 status word (or error code on failure).
Subsequently another command APDU (SIGN) is sent to the phone in order
to get a signature on the 8-byte data contained in the APDU. The phone
signs the data and sends the result back to the terminal. Timing is measured
from the time the command is sent from the terminal to the time it receives
the response back. For accuracy, we carried out 400 runs of the protocol and
computed the average. All timings were recorded in milliseconds (ms).
4.6.1 SE-app Testing
Table 4.3 shows a statistical analysis of the results from the SE-app on the
Nokia hardware SE. It shows the statistics for individual commands as well as
the protocol in full over 400 runs.
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Table 4.3: SE-app Testing Results in Milliseconds
SE-app SELECT SIGN ENCRYPT FULL PROTOCOL
AVERAGE 18 1679 285 1982
MODE 18 1691 283 2002
MEDIAN 18 1680 284 1984
MAX 116 1746 300 2105
MIN 17 1618 279 1917
From Table 4.3 we see that the SELECT command had an average execu-
tion time of 18.6ms. SELECT is a fairly light-weight command requiring no
cryptographic processing and simply returning a status response. However,
the first SELECT command of the 400 runs took 116ms. This is because of
the initialisation and anti-collision phase, which is not present in the remain-
ing runs, which had very consistent execution times with the minimum and
maximum times differing by at most 3ms. It is important to note that in a
real-life scenario, for every tap of the phone unto a terminal by the user, there
will be an initialisation and anti-collision phase. Overall our test protocol
had an average execution time of 1982ms, with about 85 percent of the time
spent on digitally signing the message. The absolute duration would be too
long for timing-critical applications (e.g. transport ticketing), although the
measurements are very consistent, with some variation due to experimental
tolerances.
4.6.2 HCE-app Testing
For the HCE-app, we did things slightly differently; we ran the test in two
different scenarios which we will henceforth refer to as Case 1 and Case 2.
As suggested in [93] “While measuring CPU power, or holding CPU power
constant in order to make other measurements, it may be best to hold the
number of CPUs brought online constant, such as to have one CPU online
and the rest oﬄine (hotplugged out)”. In our case, the Nexus 5 has a multi-
core processor with four cores, so we hot-plugged three of them, leaving only
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one online. This was to ensure that all processes ran on the same CPU, giving
us better control of the testing platform.
4.6.2.1 HCE-app Testing: Case 1
Here, the ondemand governor running at 960Mhz (default) was used. While
running the application, we engaged in a deliberate simulation of the day-to-
day things a mobile phone user could actually be doing, such as opening social
media applications and answering phone calls. This was to mirror the day-to-
day behaviour of a typical user’s device when it is tapped on a terminal at a
train station. From Table 4.4 below, the first SELECT command took longer
than the others (as was the case with the SE-app) i.e. 60ms as compared to
the average of 12ms. The full protocol ran in an average of 213ms; however, it
is interesting to see that the range between the MAX and MIN values of the
full protocol was 708ms, which is a significant variation. Similar variations
were measured for SIGN and ENCRYPT values individually, which ran on
average for 110ms and 91ms respectively but with a range of 475ms and 404ms
respectively.
Table 4.4 shows a statistical analysis of the results from the HCE-app (Case
1). It shows the statistics for individual commands as well the protocol in full
over 400 runs.
Table 4.4: HCE-app Testing Results in Milliseconds (Case 1)
SELECT SIGN ENCRYPT FULL PROTOCOL
AVERAGE 12 110 91 213
MODE 11 85 82 171
MEDIAN 12 95 81 188
MAX 60 544 465 853
MIN 10 69 61 145
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4.6.2.2 HCE-app Testing: Case 2
Table 4.5 shows a statistical analysis of the results from the HCE-app (Case
2). It shows the statistics for individual commands as well the protocol in full
over 400 runs.
Table 4.5: HCE-app Testing Results in Milliseconds (Case 2)
SELECT SIGN ENCRYPT FULL PROTOCOL
AVERAGE 20 301 250 572
MODE 20 271 235 529
MEDIAN 20 294 236 550
MAX 99 883 809 1146
MIN 16 265 222 514
After noticing the high variance in the results produced in Case 1, we
decided to clock the CPU at its lowest possible frequency state of 300Mhz.
To achieve this we changed the CPU governor from the default ondemand
governor to the userspace governor; with this, we were able to set exactly the
CPU frequency. We also set the minimum and maximum frequency to both
be 300Mhz as suggested in [93], giving us assurance that the CPU was fixed at
300Mhz.The protocol was run under these conditions and Table 4.5 shows the
results. As in previous tests, the first SELECT command was slower, taking
99ms as compared to the overall average of 20ms. The full protocol took an
average of 572ms, but similar to Case 1, there was a significant range of 632ms.
The same applied to the SIGN and ENCRYPT values, with averages of 301ms
and 250ms respectively, and ranges of 618ms and 587ms respectively.
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4.7 Discussion
In this section, we put all three tests together to conduct analysis and make
comparisons.
Figure 4.2: Graph Showing the Results of All the Tests
Figure 4.2 shows that the SE-app has a more clustered line graph (almost
a constant), while the two HCE-app cases show marked variations in values.
We can see how the CPU clock affects average execution time for the protocol;
however, wide variations exist even when the CPU core is allowed to run at
full speed. The absolute execution time of the SE is notably slower than the
HCE-apps although this is perhaps an unfair comparison as the Android phone
is still current whereas the Nokia phone (and its SE) was produced in 2006.
Furthermore, the HCE-app would likely be significantly slower in practice if
software security measures were required to reduce side-channel leakage and
improve attack resistance. What is most interesting is the variation in the
HCE-app response times, which may call into question HCE use in time-
critical applications. For example, in transport ticketing applications there is
a strict requirement that a gate transaction should be completed in less than
500ms [36,94]. We are seeing variations that are greater than this, regardless
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of the expected execution time.
This timing variation could also prevent the use of some security mea-
sures to detect fake cards or attacks in progress. For example, there has been
prior work in detecting RFID relay attacks [95] using distance bounding pro-
tocols [96–98] as a way of detecting relay attacks. These protocols establish an
upper bound on the distance of the proving party. This is done by taking into
consideration the delay introduced into the channel from the time a challenge
is sent to the time a response is received. This is only possible when there
is a reasonable benchmark for an acceptable delay. In the case of HCE, the
tolerance around the benchmark will be extremely large, making it very diffi-
cult to distinguish between a relay attack and variation due to normal phone
operation.
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4.8 Summary
In this chapter, HCE was analysed in the context of transport ticketing and
some of the underlying issues regarding large-scale implementation were dis-
cussed.A range of security mechanisms put forward to mitigate security risks
of HCE where analysed against factors that determine the success of mobile
devices in ticketing. In addition, a comparative analysis of similar implementa-
tions of SE and HCE applications was conducted. Results show the HCE-app
to be faster in terms of performance, however a significant variation in trans-
actions times from one transaction to another introduces a new dynamic that
requires careful consideration.
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Chapter 5
Blacklisting Tokenised
Payments
5.1 Introduction
Transport operators are transitioning from closed-loop ticketing systems to
open ticketing systems that rely on a well-established payment infrastructure
for fare payments. This allows users to make use of payment media such as
debit/credit cards, and mobile payment applications already in their posses-
sion, to pay for transport fares.
Historically, smartcards have provided an acceptable level of security as
required by the payment industry. The embedded chips provide a secure and
tamper-resistant storage and execution environment for payment applications
and related credentials. Of most relevance to this chapter is the Primary
Account Number (PAN) [58], which provides a unique reference to the user’s
payment device - and by extension identifies the user on the payment network.
PANs have evolved from being just an account reference of the user. Mer-
chants use PANs for unique identification of users for different purposes, such
as customer loyalty and uniquely tailored services. More significantly, in open
ticketing, PANs are used as unique identifying factors for users of the trans-
port network. In the event of dishonest behaviour by a user, such as fare
evasion, the PAN is also used to blacklist the user so no further travel is
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allowed [99,100].
5.1.1 Problem Statement
Different mechanisms have been proposed to manage the risks of HCE’s re-
liance on software and make it acceptably secure for payments. These mecha-
nisms are discussed in more detail in Section 4.4, but the focus in this chapter
is tokenisation. The goal of tokenisation is to replace the PAN in the user’s
device with a surrogate value that has a shorter life-span than the original
PAN. The rationale here is to limit the validity of the credential, so that it is
of limited use in the case of a compromise by an attacker. In transport tick-
eting, however, tokenised payments call into question the ability to blacklist
dishonest users on the transport network. This is because the PAN is replaced
with short-lived tokens that are variable. This variability makes it difficult for
transport operators to pin down a user through blacklisting since the token is
periodically renewed, in contrast to a long-term PAN. This variability in ‘iden-
tity’ exposes transport operators to attacks similar to the Sybil attack [101].
In the United Kingdom alone, over 200 million was lost in revenue due to
fare evasion and other ticketing-related fraud [102] in 2016. Therefore the to-
kenisation of PANs poses a significant threat to both academic proposals and
real-life implementations that rely on the PAN to identify or blacklist users.
5.1.2 Proposed Solution
As a solution to the problem of blacklisting, a transport ticketing scheme based
on Linkable Group Signatures (LGS) is proposed [103, 104]. In simple terms,
an LGS lets a verifier link the signatures of a user on different messages, while
keeping the identity of the signer anonymous. This ‘linkability’ property is
relied upon by the transport operator to blacklist dishonest users, regardless
of their short-lived tokens. We also exploit the anonymity inherently provided
by the LGS, which is an important user privacy requirement in transport
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ticketing systems. The details on how the LGS works is given in Section 5.4
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5.2 Privacy and Accountability
The quest for authentication and accountability in a privacy-preserving way
is not a new phenomenon, and has applicability in different use-cases. Many
cryptographic schemes facilitate the authentication of users anonymously. This
offers users a high level of privacy; however, some use-cases such as ticketing
also require accountability (i.e. the service provider is able to punish dishonest
users).
There are different approaches to balancing authentication, privacy, and
accountability [105]. The use of so-called anonymous credentials [106, 107]
has been proposed by many authors to authenticate users anonymously, and
if required, a dishonest user can be de-anonymised, thus revoking the user’s
privacy. There are also proposals based on group digital signatures, such as
in [108–111] that facilitate anonymous authentication. One unifying factor
with the aforementioned proposals is that they all require a Trusted Third
Party (TTP) to de-anonymise or open the real identity of a dishonest user.
This TTP is typically referred to as the Opening Authority (OA), or the
Revocation Authority (RA).
However, in some scenarios, exposing the real identity of the user may be
too harsh, or insignificant. For example, a Transport Operator may want to
blacklist an offending user so further travel is not allowed until the money due
is settled, but may not necessarily want to identify the user. In scenarios like
this, linking of the users’ transactions is enough to deter further usage of the
transport system while still maintaining the anonymity of the user.
In addition, there are strict functional requirements in ticketing, in which
the transaction is expected to be completed oﬄine and within a limited time-
frame. It is very challenging to meet these requirements using any solutions
that rely on a TTP for accountability since there must be a connection to the
TTP before a decision can be taken. Therefore, transport operators need a
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way to blacklist users locally, i.e. oﬄine and without the need for a TTP. We
term this type of blacklisting ‘Local Blacklisting’.
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5.3 Related Work
There are numerous transport ticketing schemes proposed that include a black-
listing functionality, and have approached blacklisting from different perspec-
tives. Blacklisting in these proposals can generally be divided into two cat-
egories; privacy preserving and non-privacy preserving blacklisting schemes.
The non-privacy preserving schemes are straight-forward, and typically in-
clude a blacklist database made up of fixed User IDs or user-device specific
IDs (UIDs). For example, the work presented in [8] blacklists users based
on their transport ID, which is a device-specific ID. As pointed out by the
authors, their solution does not provide user privacy since it is possible to
track the movement of users based on their fixed UIDs from back-end sys-
tems. Fixed UID blacklisting not only goes against the privacy requirements
of the user, but the existence of cloning mechanisms has proven this method
to be rudimentary and ineffective [112–114]. The focus in this chapter is on
privacy-preserving blacklisting schemes.
Transport ticketing schemes rely on cryptographic methods to achieve the
blacklisting of users in a privacy-preserving manner. For example the work
in [115] presents a privacy-preserving e-ticketing system that relies on the ho-
momorphic properties of the underlying encryption algorithm used. However
the performance testing presented by the author shows that the blacklisting
solution only meets the functional requirement (see Section 5.5.1) with less
than 1000 entries in the blacklist. This shows that the solution is not scalable,
and is inefficient for real-life implementations since a blacklist will be expected
to contain well above 1000 entries. Moreover, the authors did not take the
delay caused by the physical NFC channel into consideration.
Arfaoui etal. in [116] proposed a privacy-preserving NFC pass for transport
systems with a user blacklisting mechanism [116]. In their scheme, a user’s
actions on the transport network cannot be linked to his/her identity. The
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authors’ solution relied on the group signature proposed by Brickell et al. as
Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) [117] to keep a user anonymous in a
group of registered users. User blacklisting relies on an opening authority,
who is tasked with revealing the identity of a dishonest user. However, their
solution is based on pre-purchased tickets by pre-registered users and therefore
is a closed-loop ticketing system.
Similarly, D. Quercia and S. Hailes in [118] proposed a ticketing scheme
which is based on the e-cash blind signature proposed by Chaum in [119]. The
pre-issued e-tickets are globally spendable, and in the case of overspending,
users’ anonymity can be revoked. The authors however did not provide any
practical implementation, and therefore the efficiency of their solution remains
questionable.
To the best of our knowledge, the only academic proposal that conforms
to EMV and thus can be considered as an open ticketing scheme was proposed
by Ekberg et al. in [120]. The authors proposed a mass ticketing scheme using
NFC mobile devices. They also relied on the EMV infrastructure specifically.
The PAN was used as the user identity on the transport network. The PAN is
securely tied to a location at a particular time to create a ‘tap’, which is further
used to determine the fare to be paid. However, the most relevant part of their
proposal is their approach to blacklisting. The authors rely on a Certificate
Revocation List (CRL) to blacklist dishonest users. In simple terms, a CRL is
a list containing digital certificates that have been revoked before their actual
expiry date. It is assumed that the terminals at transport stations will be
updated with an up-to-date version of a CRL periodically. However, the use
of CRLs for large-scale implementations has its challenges as the distribution
of CRLs to all terminals is relatively expensive [121]. Also, there are concerns
about the unmanageable size of a CRL, especially in mass ticketing where
huge numbers of transactions are carried out. It will be challenging to update
CRLs in an efficient way [122]. In addition, the strict timing requirements of
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ticketing systems may be difficult to adhere to due to the long look-up times
of CRLs.
It is also important to highlight an industry solution to the problem of
blacklisting discussed in this chapter. The release of a tokenisation specifi-
cation for mobile payments by EMVco in 2014 [64] was the motivation for
research into the problem. In 2016, EMVco subsequently released an update of
the specification with the addition of the Payment Account Reference (PAR).
According to EMVco, the objective of the PAR is to:
“re-introduce a relationship that already exists in the payment ecosystem
today for Primary Account Number (PAN) post EMVCo Payment Tokenisa-
tion. PAR may be used to link transactions initiated on Payment Tokens with
transactions initiated on the underlying PAN to support the needs of a variety
of payment processing and value added services that rely on PAN prior to the
introduction of Payment Tokenisation.”
Furthermore, among the permissible uses of the PAR given by EMVco is
using the PAR for performing risk analysis. This affirms the importance of the
problem of blacklisting, which this chapter attempts to solve. It is also worth
noting that the solution in this chapter was proposed and published prior to
the release of the PAR specification. In addition, it could be argued that using
a PAR for blacklisting in ticketing goes against the privacy requirement of the
user since each PAR is unique to a user, and is fixed for the lifetime of the
account. Therefore the solution presented in this chapter is still superior to
the PAR in terms of privacy preservation.
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5.4 Cryptographic Background
This section provides a background to the cryptographic building blocks used
in the proposed scheme. The main cryptographic building block used is a
special type of group digital signature with a ‘linkability’ property. We also
provide a detailed explanation of the different phases involved, as well as the
intractability assumptions the signature is based upon.
5.4.1 Linkable Group Signatures (LGS)
Group signatures as first proposed by Chaum et al. in [108] allow any member
of a particular group to generate signatures anonymously. The verifier gets
cryptographic assurances that a legitimate member of the group signed the
message without revealing the signer’s identity.
Group signatures with different properties have been proposed in the lit-
erature. In this study, the LGS first proposed in [104] (referred to as a list
signature) and standardised by ISO/IEC in [103] is used. In its original con-
struction, it supports the linking of signatures provided they were signed using
the same linking tag. In [104] a time frame was used as the linking tag, allow-
ing the linking of all signatures generated by a user within a given time frame.
However, [103] shows the linking tag can also be any random value, as long as
it is constant. This signature also supports both private key revocation and
verifier blacklist revocation. In the next section, we give an overview of the
processes involved in this signature. For a detailed outline of the process and
mathematical proofs, please refer to [103,104].
5.4.2 Intractability Solutions
5.4.2.1 Strong RSA Assumption
First introduced in [123]; Let p′ and q′ be two distinct primes of equal length
such that: p = 2p′ + 1 and q = 2q′ + 1 are also primes. The multiplicative
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Notation Meaning
Tk Token generated from the PAN
tnt Timestamp at the point of entry
txt Timestamp at the point of exit
Rn Random nonce
stnid Unique train station identity
Sigx linkable signature with key x
bsn linking base
T4 linking tag
A, e, x signature key
Gpk group public key = (n, a, a0, g, h, b)
Gmk group membership issuing key = (p’, q’)
CHALL {tnt/txt||Rn||stnid}
Tap {tnt/txt||Rn||stnid||Tk||T4}
Table 5.1: Notations and Meanings
group of quadratic residues modulo n denoted by QR(n), is a cyclic group of
order p′q′, where n = pq, and is referred to as the safe RSA modulus.
5.4.2.2 Decision Diffie-Hellman Assumption(DDH)
Let g be the generator of a finite cyclic group G. The DDH assumption [124]
for group G states that it is hard to distinguish the DDH tuple: (gx, gy, gxy)
from random triples (gx, gy, gz), for a random (x, y, z) modulo the order of
group G.
In general, the DDH problem can also be constructed for arbitrary finite
abelian groups. Therefore, if G = QR(n), then G has composite order. If the
group composition of G is known, then the DDH problem in G is reduced to
the DDH problem in the components of G.
5.4.3 Linkable Group Signature Processes
The phases involved in the usage of an LGS are described below, the notations
used in [103] are maintained, and their meanings are given in Section 5.4.2.2.
1. Key Generation Process The key generation is made up of two parts:
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set-up phase and the group membership issuing phase. In the set-up phase,
the group manager creates the group public parameter, Gpk, and Gmk. The
group membership issuing process is a protocol run between the group man-
ager and a group member to create a unique signature key (A, e, x), where
(x) is the private key and (A, e) are the group membership certificate for
each group member. We assume the presence of a secure channel between
the group manager and the group member.
(a) Set-up Process: We assume the existence of two hash functions H:
{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k and HΓ : {0, 1} → {0, 1}2lp. The group manager
chooses the group public parameters: (lp, k, lx, le, lE, lX , ). The group
manager also chooses random generators: (a, a0, g, h, b) of QR(n). Gpk
= (n, a, a0, g, h, b) and Gmk = (p’, q’)
(b) Group Membership Issuing Process: At the end of this phase, the
member knows a random x ∈ [0, 2lx−1] and the group manager knows
ax mod n and nothing more. Then the group manager chooses a
random prime e ∈ [2lE − 2le + 1] and computes A = (a0C2)d1 mod n
where C2 = a
x mod n and d1 = 1/e mod n. The group manager sends
A and e to the member. The member checks that Ae = a0a
x mod n.
The group member signature key is (A, e, x) and x is the private key.
2. Signing Process: The signature process takes as input: the (Gpk), the
group member’s signature key (A, e, x), a linking base (bsn) and the message
to be signed and outputs a linkable signature Sigx.
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Algorithm 1 Signing
1: Compute f = (HΓ(bsn))
2 (mod n)
2: Chooses random integers: w1, w2, w3 ∈ [0, 22lp − 1]
3: Compute: T1 = Ab
w1 (mod n),
T2 = g
w1hw2 (mod n),
T3 = g
ehw3 (mod n),
T4 = f
x (mod n).
4: Choose random integers:
r1 ∈ [0, 2(le+k) − 1],
r2 ∈ [0, 2(lx+k) − 1],
r3, r4, r5 ∈ [0, 2(lp+k) − 1]
5: Choose random integers: r9, r10 ∈ [0, 2(2lp+le+k) − 1]
6: Compute: d1 = T
r1
1 /(a
r2br9) (mod n)
d2 = T
r1
2 /(g
r9hr10) (mod n)
d3 = g
r3hr4 (mod n)
d4 = g
r1hr5 (mod n)
d5 = f
r2 (mod n)
7: Compute:
c = H(a||a0||g||h||T1||T2||T3||T4||d1||...d5||m)
s1 = r1 − c(e− 2lE), s2 = r2 − c(x− 2lX),
s3 = r3 − cw1, s4 = r4 − cw2,
s5 = r5 − cw3, s9 = r9 − cew1,
s10 = r10 − cew2
8: Set the signature as:
Sigx = (c, s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s9, s10, T1, T2, T3, T4)
3. Verification Process: The verification process takes as input a message,
bsn, a linkable signature Sigx, and Gpk corresponding to the group of the
signer. It returns 1 if the signature is VALID, otherwise it returns 0.
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Algorithm 2 Verification
1: Compute:
f = HΓ(bsn))
2 (mod n)
t1 = a
c
0T
s1−cl′
1 /(a
s2−cLbs9) (mod n) where l′ = 2lEandL = 2lX
t2 = T
s1−cl′
2 /(g
s9hs10) (mod n) where l′ = 2lE
t3 = T
c
2g
s3hs4 (mod n)
t4 = T
c
3g
s1−cl′hs5 (mod n) where l′ = 2lE
t5 = T
c
4f
s2−cL (mod n) where L = 2lX
2: Compute:
c’ = H(a||a0||g||h||T1||T2||T3||T4||d1||d2||d3||d4||d5||m)
3: If
c’= c, s1 ∈ [−2le+k, 2(le+k) − 1],
s2 ∈ [−2lx+k, 2(lx+k) − 1],
s3 ∈ [−22lp+k, 2(2lp+k) − 1],
s4 ∈ [−22lp+k, 2(2lp+k) − 1],
s5 ∈ [−22lp+k, 2(2lp+k) − 1],
s9 ∈ [−22lp+le+k, 2(2lp+le+k) − 1],
s10 ∈ [−2lp+le+k, 2(2lp+le+k)− 1] return 1 (valid signature) else return 0 (invalid
signature)
4. Linking Process: The linking process takes two valid linkable signatures
and determines if they are linked, i.e. if they were signed by the same user.
Algorithm 3 Linking
Takes two valid linkable signatures:
(c, s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s9, s10, T1, T2, T3, T4) and
(c′, s′1, s
′
2, s
′
3, s
′
4, s
′
5, s
′
9, s10′ , T
′
1, T
′
2, T
′
3, T
′
4)) If T4 = T
′
4 output 1 i.e they are
linked, otherwise 0
5. Revocation Process: The original construction of the signature supports
two types of revocation: Private Key Revocation andVerifier Blacklist Re-
vocation. In this proposal, we focus on the verifier blacklist revocation. To
blacklist a user, the verifier generates a blacklist using the corresponding
T4 of the user. Therefore the verifier can check if the user is on the blacklist
by first verifying the signature as valid, and then carrying out the blacklist
check as follows: for each T4’, check T4’ 6= T4. If any of the checks fail,
output 0 (revoked), otherwise, output 1 (valid).
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5.5 Proposed Ticketing Scheme
In this section, we outline the general architecture of our proposed model. We
define the entities involved, as well as the roles they play in Section 5.5.5.
We also highlight the general assumptions made which are necessary for our
proposed model in Section 5.5.4. The proposed ticketing scheme is an account
based, open-ticketing scheme, that is based on the ‘Aggregated Pay As You
Go’ model [16] proposed by the UK Cards Association (UKCA) which intended
for EMV cards and NFC-enabled mobile devices1. As mentioned in Chapter 2,
ticketing requirements always depend on the specifics of its implementation,
and also open ticketing systems have fewer requirements than closed ticket-
ing systems. Therefore the requirements presented in Sections 5.5.1 and 5.5.2
respectively, represent a subset of the ticketing requirements presented in Sec-
tion 2.4. The scheme is divided into different but interconnected phases as
presented in Section 5.5.6.
Figure 5.1 shows the sequence of messages exchanged in the proposed pro-
tocol.
5.5.1 Functional Requirements
1. Oﬄine Transaction: transport ticketing systems are required to com-
plete transactions oﬄine, i.e. without requiring internet connection to
instantly to carry out back-office validations.
2. Efficiency: Transport ticketing systems should be very efficient in terms
of passenger throughput. Therefore they are required to produce trans-
action speeds of 300 – 500 milliseconds [32, 33] from the time the user
taps the device to the time the terminal grants or rejects access.
1Prior to using the scheme, it is assumed that a user already has a payment application
that conforms to the EMV specification already provisioned to the device.
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5.5.2 Security Requirements
The security requirements of open tickets are less that the requirement of
closed-loop tickets because the logic is in the back-office. Nevertheless, the
security requirements of the protocol proposed in this chapter are presented
below:
1. Integrity: It should be possible to verify whether a wrong ticketing cre-
dential is used. There should also be cryptographic evidence binding the
user’s transaction to a location at a particular time.
2. Anonymity: Although more of a privacy concern, the identity of the user
of a transport system must not be revealed.
3. Exculpability: It should be impossible for any entities, including the
group manager, to falsely accuse a user of making a transaction at an
entry or exit point on the transport network.
4. Blacklisting: It should be possible to build a blacklist of dishonest users
(or compromised devices), and be able to deny them further use of the
transport network.
5.5.3 Adversary Model
The motivation for an adversary here is to abuse the ‘first time travel risk’
(see Section 2.3.4), by maliciously evading detection on the blacklist. The
adversary could either be an attacker in possession of a stolen device, or a
legitimate user trying to cheat the system. A determined attacker will try to
avoid the blacklisting mechanism by producing a signature with a fake linking
tag. According to the described Adversary model, we list the presumptive
capabilities of the attacker below:
1. The attacker cannot break the linkable signature algorithm used in this
chapter.
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User’s Device Terminal Back-Office TSP
{tnt/txt||Rn||stnid}
1
Sigx{{tnt/txt||Rn||stnid} ||Tk}||Tk
2
verifySig
checkBlacklist
SUCCESS
3
tap {tnt/txt||Rn||stnid||Tk||T4}
4
taps Aggregation,
Fare Calculation
payReq
5
payResp
6
UpdateBlacklist
7
Figure 5.1: Protocol Diagram of the Proposed Solution
2. The attacker is active, and can generate fake tokens and linking tags.
3. The attacker has access to the payment device, as well as a legitimate
signing key.
5.5.4 Assumptions
1. The transport application, and credentials including cryptographic ma-
terial, shall be provisioned to the user’s device using secure best practices
such as GlobalPlatform.
2. The payment networks act as a TSP, and shall subject users to necessary
identification and verification (ID&V) prior to issuing new tokens.
3. Each user is part of a group of users depending on their payment network.
For example, all MasterCard users are part of the same group.
4. The validity of the tokens used is at least 24 hours. This is a configurable
value, in reality, the validity of the token will be based on the perceived
residual risk of exposure on the users’ devices.
5. We assume the security features available via the platform/OS out of
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the box, will be in place to store tokens, keys, and other cryptographic
material.
6. The user is in possession of an NFC device with a payment application
used for regular tokenised payments such as retail.
7. There is mutual trust between the TrO and the rest of the EMV ecosys-
tem, and the terminals will be provided with the group public keys of
the payment network.
8. Each train station has terminals at entry and exit points. Terminals are
NFC readers equipped with turnstiles to grant or deny entry to users.
5.5.5 Entities
In the following subsections, the functions of the entities that make up the
architecture of the proposed model are described.
5.5.5.1 User
A user in this context will already have a bank account and possibly a bank
card. The user also has a NFC-enabled mobile device as well as a payment
application provisioned to the device.
5.5.5.2 Terminal
The terminal owned and managed by a TrO, and is used to validate that
users have valid tickets on their devices before travelling. The taps made on
terminals at each station are collected and are periodically sent to the back-
office for processing. The TrO also maintains a blacklist of dishonest users
in cases where the user has insufficient funds or in the case of a compromise.
The terminals are periodically updated with the most up-to-date blacklist, to
ensure they don’t allow blacklisted users travel.
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5.5.5.3 Back-Office
The back-office provides fare management and accounting services on behalf
of the TrOs. The back-office collates and aggregated all the taps from the
terminals, to establish the right fare to charge users. The back-office also the
initiates the process of authorisation via the TSP to recover funds from users’
account. The back-office also manages user-blacklisting, and periodically up-
dates the terminals.
5.5.5.4 Token Service Provider (TSP)
The TSP provides card management services including:
1. Digitising Physical card PANS into tokens.
2. Perform the necessary identification and verification (ID&V) of users
prior to issuing new tokens.
3. Initial and subsequent provisioning of tokens to users’ devices.
4. Translation of tokens back to PANs, to facilitate authorisation of funds
from the users’ accounts.
For the ticketing solution presented in this chapter, we assume the payment
networks will act as the TSP. The rationale behind the decision to use the
payment network as the TSP is that globally there are fewer payment networks
than banks2. Therefore this means that the TO’s terminal will have to keep a
few group public keys for signature verification.
5.5.6 Phases
Our solution is divided into 4 phases: set-up, validation, accounting, and
the blacklisting phase. The specifics of the accounting phase are beyond the
2The EMVco specification on tokenisation indicates that the payment networks can ad-
ditionally act as the TSP, while still maintaining their primary roles in the EMV ecosystem.
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scope of this chapter. It is however important to mention as it precedes the
blacklisting phase.
5.5.6.1 Setup Phase:
This phase is executed between a user and the payment network. A user
initiates this phase by opting to use the payment application on his device
for transport payments. They both engage in an ID&V process to verify the
user’s identity and bank account, and check if the user’s has any outstanding
transport fares. The process is terminated if any of the checks fail. Otherwise
they go through the key generation process as explained in section 5.5.6. In
the end, the user will have a unique signature key; (A, e, x), a token (Tk), and
a TrO-specific (bsn) securely stored on their device. We assume the TSPs
group public keys to be well known and are provided to the TrOs well before
hand.
5.5.6.2 Validation Phase:
This phase is illustrated in Figure 5.1. We see that a user taps their device on
a terminal at a train station, the terminal sends a challenge to the device as
shown in Message 1. The challenge includes; timestamp (tX), random nonce
(Rn) and the station ID (stnid). The device concatenates the token (Tk) to the
challenge, and signs as explained in the signing phase in section 5.5.6, using
the (bsn) of the TrO. The (tx) could either be (tnt) or (txt) for entry and exit
gates respectively. The device the concatenates (Tk) to the signed message
and sends to the terminal in Message 2. The terminal verifies the signature
using (Gpk) as outlined in verification phase in section 5.5.6. If the signature is
valid, the terminal checks to see if the user’s (T4) is included in the blacklist.
If it doesn’t correspond with any (T4) on the blacklist, the user is allowed
to travel otherwise the user is denied travel (Message 3). Afterwards, the
terminal records a TAP . A TAP includes the challenge signed by the user’s
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device, the (Tk), and the amount to be charged which is determined in the
accounting phase below. The blacklist check is only needed at the entry gates.
5.5.6.3 Accounting Phase
This is a back-office process where taps of all users for the day are aggregated
to determine the fares to be paid by the users. The office received all the
taps made by users from the terminals as shown in Message 4. The back-
office also initiates the process of payment authorisation by sending a payment
request (payReq) in Message 5, which includes the (Tk) and the amount to
be charged, to the TSP for authorisation. The payment network, acting as the
TSP, translates the token back to a real PAN and authorisation is processed via
the users’ issuing bank as per normal EMV flow. The details of the payment
authorisation is beyond the our scope.
5.5.6.4 Blacklisting Phase
This phase only becomes necessary in cases where an authorisation fails due to
insufficient funds in the user’s account. The TSP sends a transaction decline
message to the TO. The TrO then puts the user’s T4 in its blacklist database
and updates the terminals at the stations with the latest blacklist entries. A
user’s device can also be put in the blacklist in the case of compromise or a
lost device.
5.5.7 Proof of Concept
A Proof of Concept (PoC) was developed to test the feasibility of our proposal
and also analyse it against the requirements mentioned in section Section 5.5.2.
A HCE-based Android application was installed on an NFC device for digital
signature implementation. We adapted an implementation of the digital sig-
nature in [125] which was part of an analysis of group signatures on mobile
devices [126]. For the terminal, we had a Java application using the smartcard
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I/O API running on a PC; this acted as the terminal at a train station.
Device Manufacturer Operating System RAM
Phone (Nexus 5) LG Electronics Android 5.1.1 (Lollipop) 2GB
Laptop Dell Windows 10 8GB
Reader ACS(ACR1281U) N/A N/A
Table 5.2: Devices Used in Proof of Concept
5.5.8 Lessons Learned and Considerations
Support for extended Application Protocol Data Units (APDUs)3 on NFC
devices is still not as extensive as that for smartcards. Therefore most NFC
devices can only send normal APDUs with a maximum length of 256 bytes. We
realised this was a software-based restriction rather than the NFC controller’s
inability to handle bigger messages. Due to the size of the signature in our
protocol, we modified the Android source to allow the device to send back the
signature in one APDU, rather than in chunks.
Sending a substantial amount of data over the NFC channel may not always
be efficient. Due to the size of the signature we used, we realised the time cost
of compressing the message and decompressing at the terminal’s side is trivial.
We found the BZip2 compression algorithm to be the most efficient.
Most of the parts of the signature can be precomputed; that is those parts
that do not depend on a challenge from the terminal.
5.5.9 Performance Analysis
The total size of Sigx{{tnt/txt||Rn||stnid} ||Tk}||Tk is 3552 bytes, with a 512-
bit key, including 16 bytes for concatenating the token to the signature in
plain text. This is compressed to 1617 bytes, providing 45.7% compression.
We took average timings of individual processes, as well as the total time
3Application Protocol Data Unit is the unit of communication between a device and a
terminal. APDUs are specified in ISO/IEC 7816.
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CHALL Sign Verify Full Protocol
Average 420.75 9.92 20.5 451.17
Min 405.55 7.65 17.32 430.45
Max 445.63 10.65 23.75 480.03
Table 5.3: Protocol Transaction Times in Milliseconds
it took the full protocol to run over 100 iterations. The mobile device takes
an average of 9.92ms to sign the challenge received from the terminal and
also compress the signature. The Round Trip Time (RTT), i.e. the time
from when the terminal sends the challenge to when it receives the response,
takes on average 420.75ms. We refer to this as CHALL. It is important to
note that about 90% of the RTT is spent on the NFC communication link.
The signature verification on the terminal side, including decompression of the
received data, takes 20.5ms on average. The whole protocol takes on average
451.17ms.
For performance measurements when checking the blacklist, we relied on a
comparative study of Database Management Systems (DBMS) in [127]. Each
DBMS was populated with 1,000,000 records, and the timings for a ‘select’
query for each was taken. The select query emulates the look-up of a user’s
(T4) from a blacklist database. The SQL Server was the fastest and took
18ms, while the slowest was Oracle which took 23ms. These projections show
that the delay introduced by searching a blacklist is trivial and therefore, our
protocol still runs within the accepted transaction time range for transport
usage.
5.5.10 Requirements Analysis
We analysed our proposal against both the security and functional require-
ments mentioned in section Section 5.5.2. Our model meets the oﬄine verifi-
cation requirement because the terminal is able to verify a signature, as well
as run the blacklisting function oﬄine, i.e. without connecting to a back-office
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or relying on a third party. The protocol, as shown in Section 5.5.9, is within
the acceptable transaction speed range, as stipulated by the efficiency require-
ment. It is worth noting that, currently, NFC devices in HCE only operate at
the lowest NFC data rate of 106kbps4. We found out this limitation is also a
software limitation and not the NFC controller’s inability to operate at higher
data rates. Therefore at higher rates, our solution is expected to be much
faster.
In terms of security, for a signature verified to be valid, it is computation-
ally hard for anyone other than the group manager to reveal the identity of
the actual signer. In the random oracle model, the proof of knowledge that
is part of the signature can be proven in statistically zero knowledge. Also
trying to identify a particular signer with certificate (A, e) requires the adver-
sary to know if logbT1/A, loggT2, and loggT3/g
e are equal. This is assumed to
be infeasible under the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. Therefore our
protocol meets the anonymity requirement.
As shown in the key generation phase in Section 5.5.6, the group manager
does not learn any new information about the user’s private key (x ), and at
the end of the phase, the group manager only learns ax. Also, because (T1,
T2 and T3) represent an unconditional binding commitments to (A and e).
This implies that if the factorisation of n is feasible, the group signature is a
proof of knowledge of the discrete logarithm of A/a0 [109]. Therefore no entity,
including the transport operator and the TSP – acting as the group manager,
can sign a message on behalf of a user as computing a discrete logarithm
is assumed to be infeasible. Therefore our protocol meets the exculpability
requirement because a user cannot be framed for a false transaction.
In addition, integrity is achieved because it is not possible for anyone with-
out access to the private key (x) to generate a valid signature. Secondly, the
TrO is able to verify that the signed message includes the correct challenge
4NFC supports data rate of 106, 212, 424, and 848kbps
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it had sent, thereby cryptographically linking the user to that point on the
transport network at that particular time, creating the tap.
User blacklisting is achieved because a legitimate user cannot avoid detec-
tion on the blacklist by forging a false linking base. The (T4) is linked with
(T1) through the proof of knowledge and also the private key x. In addition,
a legitimate user cannot repeatedly cheat the system by signing on a rogue
token with a legitimate credential, because after the first payment request is
declined, the TrO can blacklist the user with the corresponding (T4).
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5.6 Summary
The work presented in this chapter looks at how tokenisation affects the unique
identification of users in certain scenarios. In particular, how tokenisation calls
into question user blacklisting in transport ticketing has been highlighted. It
has been shown how LGS can be used to link two transactions regardless of
the changing token. This concept is used to create a blacklist of dishonest
users.
The feasibility of the solution has been tested by building a PoC which is
analysed against the outlined functional requirements. The solution can also
be used in use-cases outside of ticketing that rely on the static nature of PANs.
For example, it can be used in retail to link different transactions of a user
(with different tokens) for loyalty and promotional purposes.
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Chapter 6
Ecosystems of Trusted
Execution Environments
A TEE is a secure and trusted area of the main processor that provides memory
protection, and secure execution for applications (or part of an application) on
a mobile device. The TEE ensures isolation and integrity protection from any
applications running in non-TEE environments of the same device. These se-
curity services make TEEs suitable candidates to increase the attack-resistance
of HCE applications. HCE applications can rely on the TEE to isolate their
cryptographic operations and keys from the rest of the ‘untrusted’ applica-
tions. This idea has been widely suggested in many publications [68,128,129].
However, access to the TEE is not open to users, service providers, or third-
party application developers, due to both commercial and security reasons.
The OEMs restrict the TEE and its functionality for their own internal use,
or for the selected applications they approve [130,131]. The TEE suffers from
the same conundrum as the SE, and current implementational models cannot
be fully utilised by HCE applications, as it is widely hypothesised.
In this chapter, an outline of TEE as a technology and the security services
they provide is given. A brief description of two of the most prevalent TEE
implementations on the market is given. As a solution to the issue of lack
accessibility to TEEs, two possible ecosystem models for TEEs —Security
as a Service and Consumer-Centric models— are proposed. These models,
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alongside the existent model of TEEs (centralised model) are then compared
according to a set criteria to identify the advantages as well as the shortcomings
of each model.
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6.1 Trusted Execution Environment
A Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) represents a set of software and
hardware components relied upon to provide a secure storage and execution
environment on devices. The TEE where applicable, forms the backbone of
the device’s Trusted Computing Base (TCB). The TCB of a device is a collec-
tion of all software, firmware, hardware components that are explicitly trusted
to enforce security on a device. Typically, TEEs are logically separated from
the Operating System(OS), applications, and other peripherals running in the
normal execution environment of the device, thereby taking them out of the
TCB . This provides the notion of “Trusted Execution Environment” and
“Rich Execution Environment”(REE) for the trusted/secure and untrusted
sides of the device respectively. There have been efforts to standardise TEEs
by GlobalPlatform [132] through its “Device Committee”, and have published
a set of specifications. The specifications do not insist on any specific archi-
tecture, but specify the software [133] and hardware configurations [134] that
make up a TEE. It also highlights various components that could be used to
host a TEE, as well as resource sharing and memory management between
the Rich OS and the Trusted OS. In the coming section, a description of the
generic services provided by a TEE is given.
6.1.1 TEE Security Services
1. Isolated Execution: A TEE should have the ability to execute a piece
of code in complete isolation from the other applications running on the
device (including the main OS. This offers confidentiality and integrity
of the code and related data at “run time”. For example, a payment
application on a mobile device should be able to generate digital signa-
tures, without other applications observing the process or having access
to the signing keys.
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2. Secure Storage: A TEE should also provide assurances with regards
to the integrity, confidentiality and in most cases the freshness of data
at rest for the applications. For example, applications such as transit
and payment make use of sensitive data such as cryptographic keys,
passwords and primary account numbers (PANs) that must be protected
against unauthorised access at all times.
3. Remote Attestation: Attestation, means “to vouch for something”. Re-
mote attestation is the ability to vouch for an entity or its characteristics
to a third party. In the context of TEEs, it is used to give assurances
to a service that a piece of software or OS is trustworthy. For exam-
ple, in mobile payments, the issuer can get assurances through remote
attestation on the integrity of the banking application running on the
device. A remote attestation protocol normally begins with an integrity
measurement of the TCB as a whole. This is done by taking a digest
of the code, for example by using a hash function, and signing it with a
key, stored preferably in a hardware RTS. A third party can verify the
signature and compare it against a list of trusted OS hashes.
4. Secure Provisioning: Secure provisioning is the ability to send data to
a device or a particular software component running on the device in a
secure fashion. This gives service providers a way to provision applica-
tions and make relevant updates. For example, in payment applications,
banks require a secure mechanism to deliver the application to the device
of its user. There must be assurances on the integrity of the application
as well as the confidentiality of other cryptographic data.
5. Trusted Path: A TEE should also provide a secure input/output mecha-
nism with which users can interact with applications on the device. For
example, payment applications often require user verification through
PINs or biometrics. The TEE should provide a trusted path between the
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Figure 6.1: Architecture of TrustZone on a Mobile Device [2]
application and the keypad. This provides protection against malware on
the device, which normally might be able to access sensitive data entered
by user by logging keystrokes, or by more sophisticated methods such
as sniffing data on the physical communication layer. Globalplatform
has published specifications [135] for providing a trusted path through a
TEE on mobile devices.
6.1.2 ARM’s TrustZone
TrustZone is ARM’s security technology solution provided by the more recent
ARM processors. TrustZone achieves security by logically separating hardware
and software resources into two distinct modes, referred to by ARM as the
“secure mode” and “normal mode”(non secure). The resources in the secure
mode cannot be accessed by the resources in the normal mode.
TrustZone Hardware Architecture
The secure/normal world separation is extended to the hardware components,
and this is enforced by a hardware logic in the TrustZone-enabled AMBA3
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AXI bus fabric [2]. The AMBA3 AXI bus provides an extra control signal,
known as the NS bit, to read and write channels which are on the main system
bus. If NS-bit = 0, then the processor is in the secure mode; otherwise, if
NS-bit = 1 it indicates the processor is operating in the normal mode. This
transition between the two modes is controlled by a mechanism referred to as
the monitor mode as shown in Fig 6.1.
TrustZone also secures peripherals such as interrupt controllers, timers,
and I/O components through the AMBA3 APB peripheral bus. This ensures
that the system is monitored by a task that cannot be interrupted by malware.
The AMBA3 APB peripheral bus is a low gate-count and low-bandwidth pe-
ripheral bus that is connected to the system bus using an AXI-to-APB bridge.
This bridge controls access to the peripherals, ensuring only requests with the
necessary security status reach the peripherals.
The processor switches between the two modes (context switching) in a
time-sliced fashion and is controlled by the “monitor mode”. For an appli-
cation running in normal mode to make use of services offered by another
application in the secure mode, for example to encrypt a document, a special
instruction known as the “Secure Monitor Call (SMC)” is used. SMC imme-
diately sets the NS-bit to ‘0’ and then fully transfers control to the secure
mode. On the other hand, switching back from secure mode to normal mode
is less controlled, and the secure side can directly alter the “Current Processor
Status Register”. So, essentially, the monitor mode can be seen as providing
gate-keeping services between the two modes.
6.1.3 Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX)
Intel’s SGX are a set of instructions that provide extensions to the Intel ar-
chitecture processors. These extensions provide a TEE within the computer’s
untrusted environment. Intel SGX thus aims to provide confidentiality, in-
tegrity, and replay protection using enclaves [3].
118
Enclave Enclave
Page
Tables
SGX
Module
SGX User 
Runtime
SGX User 
Runtime
EPC EPCM
Application 
Environment
Privileged
Environment
Exposed 
Hardware
Instructions
EEXIT
EGETKEY
EREPORT
EENTER
ERESUME
Instructions
ECREATE
EADD
EEXTEND
EINIT
EREMOVE
Figure 6.2: Hardware and Software Architecture of Intel SGX [3]
An enclave is part of the applications memory space which is hardware
protected. An enclave has a reserved area of memory from which it runs,
known as the enclave page cache (EPC). Access to the EPC is protected from
processes outside of the enclave. The OS can manage the enclaves, but cannot
tamper with the code and data within the enclave itself.
The management of an enclave is carried out through a set of instructions.
The ECREATE instruction creates an enclave and also sets the base linear
address as well as the physical address. After the creation of an enclave,
the EADD instruction is used to add relevant code and data to the enclave.
This adds 4KB of protected data. For integrity protection, the EEXTEND
instruction is used to measure the contents of the enclave. This measures 256
bytes at a time; therefore, to measure the whole contents of the enclave, the
instruction is called 16 times [3]. The enclave is then initialised using the
EINIT instruction. This sets the INIT attribute to true, which means the
code in the enclave is ready for execution.
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6.2 Ecosystem Models for TEE
In this section, the different ecosystem models for TEEs are highlighted.
6.2.1 Centralised Model
This model represents the current state of TEE owenership models. In this
model, the OEM has full control of the TEE service provisioning. At the core,
this is the same ecosystem as the Issuer-Centric Ownership Model in smart-
cards [136]. In the centralised model, only “trusted applications” are allowed
to be hosted on the TEE. These trusted applications in reality represent a
monopoly by the OEM. For example Samsung’s mobile payment solution —
SamsungPay— makes use of the TEE on Samsung devices, when it is not
possible for any other service provider to do the same. From a security point
of view, this model is ideal, however these restrictions limit the potential of
mobile services.
6.2.2 Security as a Service Model
The concept of Anything As a Service (*aaS) is arbitrarily used typically in
cloud computing to refer to something that is provided to end users as a service
through the cloud [137]. For example Back-end as a Service (BaaS) and Data
as a service (DaaS). Using the same concept in TEEs, SaaS is a model were the
OEM still maintains ownership and manages the TEE, but provides security
services to the applications of service providers on a contract basis. As an
example, instead of hosting a ticketing application on the TEE, it’s hosted in
the normal environment of the device, while the TEE does its cryptographic
operations such as digital signatures, and secure key storage.
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6.2.3 Consumer-Centric Model
This model gives full control of the TEE services, and application provisioning
to the user, therefore, it’s the most flexible of the three models. This model
is similar to the User-Centric Ownership Model (UCOM) for smartcards and
a potential consumer-centric model proposed by GlobalPlatform [138]. This
model is also similar to the current application provisioning mechanism de-
ployed in the smartphone industry, where a user can install or delete any
application as they desire. The user in this model has the privilege of en-
rolling, evoking or blocking access to any application that requests the TEE
services. From the liability point of view, the applications should manage their
own risk mitigation processes and users (or the OEM) might not be liable.
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6.3 Comparison Between Models
In this section, we set comparison criteria on which we will later compare and
contrast different ecosystem proposals for TEE.
6.3.1 Comparison Criteria
The rationale for constructing these criteria is to illustrate the positives as
well as the shortcomings of individual ecosystem models discussed in previ-
ous sections. Economic considerations may decide the choice of model among
the competing models, however, this does not mean that it is the best pos-
sible model. Nevertheless, the following criteria are based on the potential
elements that might play a critical role in successfully bridging the transition
of smartcard services from specialised hardware (smartcard) to smartphones.
1. Market Segmentation: Is the proposed model restrictive to a level that it
might create pockets of market access? In market segmentation, certain
applications might only be available on particular devices due to the
business relationship between service providers and OEMs.
2. Scalability: The model enables a wide scale deployment of a number
of applications, from heterogeneous service providers, therefore serving
applications with varied and potentially changing requirements.
3. Flexibility: The model is flexible in a sense that a small service provider
can also gain access to TEE services like a big corporation can.
4. Impartiality: The model does not discriminate any particular or set of
service provider(s). Any service provider that abides by the security and
privacy policies set by the model is allowed to access TEE services.
5. Consumer-Involvement: Does the consumer (users) have any involve-
ment in either provisioning or evoking the TEE services to individual
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service providers?
6. Open Provisioning: Any service provider can create an application re-
quiring access to the TEE services and potentially use these services
without requiring expansive and potentially long approval processes set
by OEMs.
7. Closed Provisioning: The provisioning of applications is solely decide by
a central authority, the OEM for example.
8. User Privacy: A set of applications on a smartphone might also signify
potential privacy information about a user. Therefore, does the model
reveal the set of applications using the TEE services to an external entity
including OEMs, and/or other service providers?
9. Application Intellectual Property (IP) Protection: The model does not
require the service provider to reveal the source code of their application
to the entity that provisions the access to the TEE services.
6.3.2 Comparison and Discussion
Based on the defined criteria in the previous section, the comparison is shown
in Table 6.1.
For the SaaS model, most of the partially met criteria is due to the nature
of the model. It does provide flexibility to small service providers to gain
access to secure services from TEE, without going through the OEMs’ approval
model. For the criteria impartiality we have marked all models except the
consumer-centric one as partially meeting the criteria, for the reason that
there is a centralised entity and guaranteeing its impartiality would be difficult.
However, for the consumer-centric model, it was marked as meeting the criteria
in full because users can give any application access to the security services
provided by the TEE.
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Table 6.1: Comparison of Different Ecosystems for TEE Deployment
Criteria Centralised Security as Consumer
Model Service Centric
1) Market Segmentation H# H#  
2) Scalability H# H#  
3) Flexibility #   
4) Impartiality H# H#  
5) Consumer-Involvement # H#  
6) Open Provisioning # H#  
7) Closed Provisioning  H# #
8) User Privacy # #  
9) Application IP Protection # H#  
Note:  if criteria is fully satisfied, H# if criteria is partially met and # if
criteria is not satisfied.
Centralised models do not fare well on the criteria including open provi-
sioning, consumer-involvement, user privacy and applications IP protection.
The reason behind this is the process which an application has to go through
before getting access to the TEE. It can be argued that App Stores man-
aged by Apple and Google already do so. However, most of these applications
might not have proprietary code like banking, transport-ticketing and mobile
network operators (soft-SIMs) might have. Such application, along with other
high security sensitive applications, might not accept it.
The consumer-centric model meets the highest number of criterion in com-
parison to all other models discussed in this chapter. It might be argued
that such a model might introduce security issues, like a malicious application
can also run in the TEE. This is possible, but TEE by no means provide an
assurance that only non-malicious application code will execute in it. Such as-
sumptions are based on prior vetting of an application by OEMs and/or TAP,
by analysing the application source code. This, as discussed before, might not
be preferable to a large set of application providers.
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6.4 Making a Case for Security as a Service
Applications such as transit and payments that require higher levels of security
that initially relied on hardware modules (such as smartcards and SEs), are
increasingly transitioning to the mobile environment. To provide comparative
levels of security, the TEE is a well-established technology to provide security.
However, as discussed in this chapter, the centralised model does not currently
provide the flexibility, for service providers to fully utilize the TEEs on their
customers devices. This is partly due to commercial reasons, as well as the
design architecture of TEEs. The current design architecture of TEEs cannot
support multi-party party access to its services. This makes the idea of having
a user-centric model of TEEs not feasible.
However, the SaaS model provides a bridge between the two extremes. The
applications of service providers can utilise the security services of the TEE,
without having complete control over the provisioning of applications or the
general management of the TEE. From a commercial perspective, this also
provides a middle ground for all the entities involved. The service providers
and users have higher levels of security, while the OEMs still control their
TEEs, and also enjoy the dividends of the security services they provide.
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6.5 Summary
In this chapter, the issue of lack of accessibility to the security services provided
by the TEE was discussed. To address the issue, two ecosystem models where
considered. The user-centric model proved to be the most desirable, but the
assumptions that would need to be in place for it to be successful are not
realistic. The SaaS model, though not the most desirable, it seems to be the
most feasible model to address the issue. In the next chapter, a novel on-device
tokenisation framework using the TEE is proposed. This is an example of how
the OEM can provide generic security services to service providers (such as
transport operators), without giving unfettered access to the TEE.
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Chapter 7
On-device Tokenisation
7.1 Introduction
The state-of-the-art in tokenisation is the periodic provisioning of tokens and
related cryptographic data to the device. The EMVCo specification [64] does
not dictate the validity of tokens, it allows both single and multiple use tokens.
The validity of the tokens is typically determined by factors such as; the
perceived level of risk on the payment device, the value of the transactions,
payment use-case e.t.c. Consequently, the shorter the validity of tokens, the
more frequent the process of token provisioning occurs.
In this chapter, the potential shortcomings of implementing tokenisation in
its classic form are discussed. These issues show the need for innovative think-
ing in implementing tokenisation in certain scenarios. To make improvements
on these shortcomings, and to build up on the work presented in Chapter 5, a
novel tokenisation framework — On-device Tokenisation — is proposed. On-
device tokenisation using Format Preserving Encryption (FPE), and relies on
the TEE on the mobile devices to securely generate and store tokens. This re-
moves the need to periodically provision new tokens to the mobile device. The
tokenisation framework proposed also uses a cryptographically secure pseudo-
random number generator to enable the Token Service Provider (TSP) and
the mobile device to generate synchronised tokens on each side, instead of
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de-tokenisation, as it is in the classic tokenisation model.
The framework envisages the OEMs playing the role of TSPs (see Sec-
tion 3.7), and generating tokens through trusted applications on the TEE.
This is a fair assumption since the OEMs have unfettered access to the TEEs
on the devices they manufacture. It also makes sense to envision OEMS as
TSPs considering the fact that Apple and Google jointly control %99.6 of the
global smartphone market [139].
A PoC was implemented to have an idea of the performance of the FPE
algorithms on mobile devices which to the best of our knowledge has not been
published before. It is worth mentioning however that the PoC fell short of
implementing the FPE algorithm in a TEE itself, and was implemented in the
normal world of the mobile device. This will form part of the future research
direction of the thesis.
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7.2 Shortcomings of Tokenisation
This section discusses the shortcomings of tokenisation which the work in this
chapter aims to solve:
Additional Cost: Although the cost of tokenisation is low compared to
other security mechanisms (see Table 4.1), there is the cost generating and
provisioning new token to the device [140]. In high-risk scenarios such as
HCE, tokens are expected to have a shorter validity, hence a higher frequency
of token generation and provisioning. This translates to additional costs in
processing, which likely to be incurred by the merchants and indirectly trans-
ferred to the users [141].
Connectivity: Token provisioning requires the mobile device to have con-
nectivity, therefore single use tokens cannot be used in scenarios that connec-
tivity cannot be guaranteed. This requirement contradicts one of the fun-
damental functional requirements of mobile devices in ticketing, (see Sec-
tion 5.5.1), because connectivity cannot be guaranteed in certain scenarios
such as; underground train stations and moving vehicles.
Potential Privacy Compromise: The use of ‘limited time’ time tokens
has the potential to compromise user-privacy in ticketing systems. For example
if the validity of the token is one week, the transport operator can potentially
track the journeys of a user until a new token is issued at the end of the week.
While this is better than having a PAN which is static, there is still room for
improvement with regards to privacy protection.
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7.3 Related Work
Tokenised payments in oﬄine environments were considered by Jayasinghe et
al. in [142]. The author’s considered payment scenarios where connectivity
cannot be guaranteed. They proposed a tokenisation mobile payments pro-
tocol based. Their solution uses risk analysis techniques similar to velocity
checking and floor-limit checks as specified by EMVCo (see page. 111–113
in [143]). The main drawback on this proposal is the efficiency of the imple-
mented protocol. According to the authors, a transaction using their protocol
is expected to take about 3.9 seconds on average. This makes it unsuitable for
use in transport ticketing payments or even retail payments (see Section 5.5.1).
A framework for enhancing tokenisation using ‘dynamic transaction tokens’
was proposed by Jayasinghe et al. in [144]. The authors proposed the use of
a fresh token per transaction (dynamic), which are generated in the SE of a
smartphone. The fundamental issue with this proposal is that if the payment
application has access to the SE, then tokenisation will not be required since
the SE is secure enough to hold the PAN itself.
The concept of ‘Updatable Tokenization’ was introduced by Cachin et al.
in [145]. They considered the problem of re-keying tokenisation algorithms
while maintaining the referential integrity1 of already tokenised data. The
authors argue that current tokenisation systems require the whole data set to
be re-tokenised with a new key any time a key update is carried out, otherwise
referential integrity is lost. As a solution, the authors proposed a scheme where
a new key and a tweak is used to generate a set of tokens for a particular
host, by the tokenising entity. The host can use the same tweak to generate
a similar set of tokens, which are used to roll forward previously generated
tokens. Their solution is designed for the storage management of token in the
back-office systems of TSPs. The solution presented in this chapter defers to
1Referential integrity here means it should be possible to previously generated tokens to
the original PAN, regardless of the Key used.
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this because the front-end generation and use of tokens is the focus, rather
than how they are stored.
7.3.1 Encryption of PANs
The encryption of PANs to create tokens presents two issues that the frame-
work presented considers; tweaking of the underlying algorithm, and handling
Luhn checks.
Tweaking in cryptography is a process of including an additional input
(tweak) to a block-cipher, alongside the usual key and plaintext. The use
of tweaks in cryptography was formalised in 2002 by Liskov et al. in [146].
Tweaks are used to increase the otherwise limited number of possible values
of a short plaintext. Recall that only the account identifier (Digits 7 to final
number minus 1) part of the 16-19 digit PAN are encrypted (see Fig. 3.4).
Note that in a database 100-million PANs, at least 100 PANs will be expected
to have the same ciphertext digits (but the unencrypted part will be different)
[147].
The tweak used for the tokenisation framework is a random number gen-
erated from a shared seed value S. For the random number generation, any
deterministic random number generator can be used. For the purpose of the
framework presented here, we assume the existence of a secure random num-
ber generator such as the ones recommended by the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) in [148]. The deterministic random num-
ber generation is required to allow both the TSP and the mobile device to
generate synchronised seedsS.
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7.4 Format Preserving Encryption (FPE)
Some applications such as in payments processing, work based on industry
defined data formats and will therefore require any use of cryptography to
preserve the required format. For example encryption of the PAN ‘1314 5678
9743 1265’ should result in a ciphertext of ‘2314 5463 8965 5482’. However,
that is not the way traditional cryptographic algorithms work. For exam-
ple, block-ciphers will pad the plaintext to the size of the underlying block
if necessary and output the ciphertext in Hex or Base64 formatting. Take
the DES-encryption of the PAN; ‘1314 5678 9743 1265’ for example. The re-
sulting ciphertext is; ‘8f8cbc3c86908031a1c229cbfb889c4d571a57b4372c8641’.
This remained an open problems in cryptography until the initial solutions
were proposed in 1997 by Smith and Brightwell in [149], and referred to it as
“datatype-preserving encryption”.
Nevertheless, the definitions of a cryptographically secure2 FPE were first
given by Black and Rogaway in [150]. They proposed three ways to achieve a
solution: the prefix method, the cycle-walking method, and the feistel struc-
ture method. The FPE used for the work in this chapter is the FF1 algorithm,
the“FF” indicates that is format-preserving and based on a feistel structure.
FF1 was submitted by Spies. et al. in [147] as a draft NIST submission and
was later accepted and published as part of a NIST specification in [4]. A
description of how feistel structures work is given below.
7.4.1 Feistel Structure
The feistel structure (also known as a Feistel network) is symmetric mechanism
used in the construction of block-ciphers. It is made-up of several iterations
of a reversible transformation, these iterations are referred to as rounds. The
reversible transformation consists of the following steps:
2with security provably related to the security of the underlying block cipher in use
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Major Industry
Identifier (MII)
Issuer Identification Number (IIN) or 
Bank Identification Number (BIN)
Luhn Check digit
Account Identifier
4677 8504 0124 6816
Figure 7.1: Layout of an On-Device Token
• Split the data into two parts A and B
• Apply keyed function, FK to one part of the data, which is used to
modify the other part
• In the next round i, the two parts of the data are swapped and the
second step is repeated.
The encryption and decryption functions using the feistel structure are
shown in Fig. 7.2. For simplicity, the diagram only shows the four rounds,
but the FF1 requires ten rounds according to the specification.
7.4.1.1 Encryption and Decryption
The length of the two plaintext strings A & B is denoted by u & v such that
u+ v = n. For encryption, the FF1 takes as input the plaintext X as numeral
strings, an optional tweak t and an encryption K and outputs ciphertext Y .
For each Round, the function FK is applied to one of the strings Bi, alongside
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Figure 7.2: Encryption and Decryption Functions using a Feistel Structure.
Source: [4]
additional variable; the length n, the round number i and the tweak t. The
output of this operation is used to modify the other half of the string Ai
through modular addition +. The resulting string is stored as a temporary
variable Ci, which is used as the Bi+1 in the next round, and Bi becomes Ai+1.
The decryption process is similar to that of encryption, with the following
differences; the order of the round indices is reversed, modular subtraction is
used instead of addition. Also, the input to the round function Fk is changed
to Ai+1, and the output is used to modify Bi+ 1 to produce Ai.
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7.5 Proposed Tokenisation Framework
7.5.1 Entities
1. Mobile Device (device): The mobile device, held by a user, is an
NFC phone with a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) where trusted
applications and cryptographic operations are carried out.
2. TSP-app: The TSP-app is a trusted application issued and installed
into the TEE within a user’s device. The procedure for installing the
TSP-app typically will involve an Identity and Verification (ID&V) step
to assert the identity of the user, this is beyond our scope.
3. Token Service Provider (TSP): The TSP is the entity that manages
the tokenisation. It is in charge of issuing the TSP-app to the users’
devices, issuing of the initial token into the TSP-app, and also the deto-
kenisation and verification of tokens during transaction processing to
determine their validity. The TSP and its systems serves as the ‘source
of truth’ for all tokens of users at any time.
4. Merchant: The merchant is a provider of goods and/or services with a
point-of-sale to receive payments made via the users’ devices. As part of
the transaction, the merchant receives a token, which must be verified
with the TSP before the transaction can be authorised. The details of
the relevant transaction data that will usually be passed here is beyond
out scope.
7.5.2 Phases
The On-device tokenisation framework is divided into five (5) distinct phases
as presented below.
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7.5.2.1 Set-up Phase
This is a one-time process carried out to configure the user’s device to use the
on-device tokenisation framework. It is assumed that the TSP has installed
the TSP-app within the TEE of users’ devices, and a shared key Ks has been
established between them.
7.5.2.2 Tokenisation Request Phase
Following a successful ID&V step, the user is prompted to enter the original
PAN for the payment card to be tokenised into the TSP-app, alongside the
result of the ID&V step is sent to the TSP-app through a trusted path. See
for a description of trusted path. Note that at no point is the PAN stored on
the device, not even in the TEE.
The TSP-app encrypts the information received with the shared key Ks,
and sends it to the TSP. We assume the TSP and the TSP-app within the TEE
of the users’ devices have a secure interface between them such as one specified
by GlobalPlatform in the Device TEE Sockets API Specification [151].
7.5.2.3 Master Token Issuance
The TSP chooses a Master Token Mt (which has the respective OEMs IIN as
leading digits) for a each PAN at random and stores the relationship. Mt is
sent to the device, alongside the chosen shared seed S. Both Mt and S are
sent to the device ready to be used for the subsequent generation of tokens
on-device.
7.5.2.4 Token Generation
The token is generated by the TSP-app prior to a transaction with a merchant.
The IIN and the luhn check digit are stripped from the Mt, to be left with
11-digit ti; which is the part that would have been the account identifier if it
was a real PAN (see Fig. 7.1). The FPE encryption algorithm takes as input;
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the 11-digit ti, the tweak t generated from the shared seed S, the shared key
Ks and outputs an 11-bit string tx. The IIN is appended to tx, the luhn
check digit of the whole string is then calculated and appended to produce the
on-device per transaction token Tk.
7.5.2.5 Detokenisation
Detokenisation is simply the reverse of the token generation process. When
a merchant receives a token from the user’s device during a transaction, it
uses the IIN to determine which TSP to route the transaction to. The TSP
receives the token and then strips the IIN and the luhn check digit from Tk to
recover tx. The TSP then inputs tx the pre-shared key Ks, the tweak t which
it can generate using the seed S into the FPE algorithm to get ti, which acts
the account identifier of the user. Using ti, the TSP can effectively route the
transaction through the payment network for authorisation as usual.
7.5.3 Proof-of-Concept and Testing
The tokenisation framework was implemented as an Android application (TSP-
app) on Samsung S5 smartphone, to test for performance. The Android im-
plementation itself is based on an earlier Java implementation for the FPE
algorithm published in [152]. The goal of the implementation was not to
asses the security of FPE algorithms, but rather, to test their performance on
a mobile device. The process of token generation happens in the background
(within the TEE) and completely invisible to the user. The Luhn check func-
tionality was also implemented as part of the TSP-app to ensure that the
tokens generated conform to the EMV specifications. The token generation
process on the device takes an average 19.6 milliseconds over 100 runs. The
performance of the detokenisation is not important since that happens later
at the TSPs back-office.
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7.6 Summary
In this chapter, a novel on-device framework has been presented. The goal was
to provide the preliminaries for a different approach to tokenised payments
especially in ticketing. The idea of using one-time on-device tokens is suitable
for ticketing because connectivity is not required for token provisioning. The
performance testing shows that the processing-times for FPE algorithms is
trivial, and therefore their efficiency is suitable for ticketing. In addition, the
framework presented in this chapter can be used in other usecases apart from
ticketing. For example, the Second Payments Directive (PSD2) regulation
mandates banks to provide 3rd Party access to users’ account if the users give
their consent. The on-device tokenisation framework can potentially be used
as a mechanism to prove the to prove user’s consent to the their respective
bank.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
This thesis set out to investigate the potential impact HCE may have on the
overall security of mobile devices in ticketing. As transport operators transi-
tion from closed-loop to open systems, this thesis also explores this relatively
new phenomenon, and determines potential problems that require different
approach. The conclusions to the main contributions of the thesis, and the
research questions were summarised.
A comparative testing of hardware SE-based card emulation and HCE-
based card emulation was conducted. HCE-based applications proved to be
the faster, what is interesting however is the significant variation in the HCE
execution times. This behaviour could call into question its use in transport
ticketing, where the performance is paramount. It also shows that security
controls such as distance-bounding protocols used for combating relay attacks
will not be feasible for HCE applications because they rely on knowledge of
expected execution times. From investigations conducted during the course
of this thesis, it is evident that the shift from SE-based to HCE-based NFC
transactions has significant impacts on transport ticketing. HCE in compar-
ison to the SE, provides a richer user interface, superior processing power,
and a more flexible ecosystem for the transport operators. However, in terms
of security, HCE undeniably introduces security risks to transport ticketing
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data and processes. The security mechanisms to mitigate these risks and in-
crease the attack resistance of HCE applications exists. Nevertheless, analysis
conducted in this thesis show that not all of mechanisms are feasible for tick-
eting. The choice of which security mechanism will largely depend on specific
use-cases, level of perceived risk, and cost.
In addition to the security mechanisms mentioned in Chapter 4, it is impor-
tant to take other supplementary security measures. Periodic user-verification
and context-aware security checks before important ticketing functions to mit-
igate the risk of exposure. For example, prior to the ticketing application or
ticket provisioning, the device can be verified to ensure it is not rooted.
The current state and maturity of these security mechanisms make tokeni-
sation the most feasible mechanism. This is partly because it can be used
with devices out-of-the-box and does not require special agreements or set-up,
as is the case with using WBC or TEEs. Tokenisation is also the preferred
security mechanism for the payments industry. Therefore as ticketing systems
increasingly transition to open ticketing systems, transport operators will have
to design ticketing systems that conform to the process in the payment ecosys-
tem.
Utilizing the well-established payment infrastructure has a lot of advan-
tages for transport ticketing. However, the problem of user blacklisting in the
case of tokenised payments shows an example of why payment mechanisms
should not be implemented out-of-the-box for ticketing without rigorous con-
siderations. The protocol presented in Chapter 5 provides a solution to the
blacklistability problem of tokenised payments that is suitable for ticketing.
And its implementation also shows that mobile devices are capable of effi-
ciently handling complex cryptographic operations to provide stronger levels
of security for ticketing. Despite the fact that the LGS used resulted in a pay-
load of considerable size (2552 bytes, compressed to 1617 bytes), modifications
to the Android OS prove that the NFC controller of the device is capable of
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sending messages that are bigger than what the OS limits it to. This further
proves the capabilities of mobile devices today in handling such algorithms.
The problem of lack of accessibility to TEEs on mobile devices was high-
lighted in Chapter 6. Potential ecosystem models that will provide more ac-
cess to TEEs were also discussed. A comparison of these models show that the
user-centric model to be the most favourable based on the set criteria. Nev-
ertheless, by virtue of the security design of current TEE implementations, it
is not realistic to envision TEEs in a user-centric ecosystem. In this light, the
SaaS model provides a middle ground to maximise the full potential of the
TEE, without the OEMs necessarily giving full access to it.
The novel tokenisation framework presented in Chapter 7 builds up on the
SaaS model discussed in Chapter 6. A method of generating tokens in the
TEE of the user’s device using FPE algorithms was proposed. This eliminates
the need to periodically provision new tokens to the device. And for open tick-
eting systems, it enhances user privacy because it is possible to use one-time
tokens, thereby protecting the user’s journey from tracking. Implementation
on a mobile device shows that the framework is efficient for ticketing, and fur-
ther asserts the fact that mobile devices are capable of providing better and
innovative security solutions.
8.0.1 Future Work
During the course of the work presented in this thesis, they’ve been areas that
required further investigations to be carried out. But due to limited resources,
in terms of time and access, it was not possible. These areas will be further
investigated in the future. These are summarised below:
1. Conducting a more comprehensive testing: In this thesis, all proposals
presented in this thesis where tested on single devices, to build upon the
initial findings, further work is planned to consider testing on additional
platforms to have a more representative view. In addition, the work in
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Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 were implemented in the ‘normal world’ of the
mobile devices due to limitations on accessing the TEE. As future work,
the plan is to provide similar implementations on the TEE, to test its
efficiency.
2. More Efficient forms of blacklisting: The future plan is to investigate
more efficient methods of achieving linkability while protecting the pri-
vacy of users. The blacklisting solution presented in Chapter 5 resulted
in a payload that is rather big, and requires compression to fit into an
APDU. While this works, a solution like this may not be suitable for a
large-scale implementation. We also aim to consider this idea of link-
ability in other use-cases such as retail, where merchants can use the
similar protocols to offer users bespoke services while still respecting
their privacy.
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